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Abstract
Attack scenario graphs provide a concise way of displaying all possible sequences of attacks
a malicious user can execute to obtain a desired goal, such as remotely achieving root unde-
tected on a critical host machine. NETSPA, the Network Security Planning Architecture,
is a C++ system that quickly generates worst-case attack graphs using a forward-chaining
depth-first search of the possible attack space using actions modeled with REM, a simple
attack description language. NETSPA accepts network configuration information from a
database that includes host and network software types and versions, intrusion detection
system placement and types, network connectivity, and firewall rulesets. It is controlled by
command line inputs that determine a critical goal state, trust relationships between hosts,
and maximum recursive depth. NETSPA was shown to efficiently provide easily understood
attack graphs that revealed non-obvious security problems against a realistic sample net-
work of 17 representative hosts using 23 REM defined actions. The largest useful graph
was generated within 1.5 minutes of execution. NETSPAexecutes faster and handles larger
networks than any existing graph generation system. This allows NETSPA to be practi-
cally used in combination with other security components to develop and analyze secure
networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security is a main concern of most network administrators. The frequency with which new
software vulnerabilities are found and subsequently fixed has been increasing steadily over
the past several years, with current incident rates as high as almost three per day [4]. This
ever increasing number of vulnerabilities and software patches, coupled with widespread
access to exploit information and public networks, provides a challenging arena for security
administrators. They must combat threats from malevolent attackers, curious crackers,
and "script kiddies," novice computer users using prepackaged exploit software. Software
vulnerability consequences range from the inadvertent disclosure of relatively unimportant
information to fully privileged remote access of critical systems.
A network security administrator must balance possible network compromises against
the necessity and convenience afforded by allowing communication between a world-accessible
network and a private internal network. For example, to allow users to effectively work on
internal projects outside the office, it is necessary to allow them some sort of remote access,
most likely in the form of a virtual private network or remote login. This opening to the
internal network, however, is one more possible point of entry for an attacker. In addition,
this sort of remote authentication also contains the possibility that the attacker will "sniff"
the transmission and obtain necessary login information, such as user name and password.
While working at home is merely a convenience, many organizations require Internet access
to perform necessary, business-related activities. A company that sells products via the
World Wide Web must allow outside users access to a database of customer information
for authentication and personalization. This access provides additional attack paths for a
9
skilled intruder.
A plethora of both hardware and software has been developed to combat network attacks
at many different levels. Vulnerability scanners attempt to inform an administrator about
single-point software vulnerabilities once a system is installed and operational. Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) monitor current system and network behavior and raise an alert
when some network packet or host behavior violates certain conditions. Firewalls, both in
hardware and software, enforce a given security policy by blocking certain types of network
access. All of these methods, however, require a physical network to function, and cannot
take advantage of a simulated network, nor aid an administrator in planning a secure
network.
Attacks sometimes only exploit a single vulnerability. Worms, for example, automated,
self-propagating attack software, often search for only a single vulnerability in a host and
exploit it if found. Novice computer attackers tend to act in much the same fashion, only
exploiting one or few vulnerabilities in order to gain some sort of access into a network.
Proficient network attackers, however, often have a goal in mind when attacking a network,
and craft their exploits to reach the goal in the easiest way. In addition, expert attackers
tend to go through many actions to both limit visibility to intrusion detection systems and
quickly exploit targets. Finally, a network attacker often leaves behind malicious software
to provide a permanent "back door" into the network. This multi-component attack can
be considered a path on a graph of all of the possible attack routes through a network,
otherwise known as an attack graph [20, 29].
This thesis describes the Network Security Planning Architecture (NETSPA), a system
that provides several necessary augmentations to the existing body of security software.
Most importantly, NETSPA generates attack graphs from a network topology, graphs of
all of the possible routes an attacker can take to exploit a user-defined network. These
graphs and their associated statistics, such as number of hosts compromised and attacker
privilege levels, allow a network administrator to determine likely intrusion paths and ex-
trapolate this data to determine the current and future security of the network given past
software vulnerability frequencies. As the attack graphs are displayed in near real-time, an
administrator can change the network topology slightly, re-compute the graphs for the new
topology, and compare the graphs produced from different configurations. This allows an
administrator to weigh network security against other factors, such as hardware costs and
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ease of maintenance. Finally, NETSPA imports information from several existing security
and network planning tools. Existing network configuration information can be obtained
through the use of tools such as nmap [11], Nessus [8], and NetViz [221. Online databases
such as ICAT [4] and the Nessus vulnerability plug-ins provide valuable information about
attack requirements and effects.
1.1 Outline
The following chapter describes some of the background behind network security issues,
including basic types of computer attacks, attack graph information, and existing security
software and information resources. Chapter 3 provides an overview of current attack graph
generation mechanisms and related attack modeling languages. Chapter 4 discusses the
design and Chapter 5 the implementation of NETSPA. Chapter 6 then shows the operation
of NETSPA against two different network configurations, one very simple and one much
more realistic, with associated security questions and scenarios. Chapter 7 details some
additional enhancements that will make NETSPA a more viable security solution, and,
finally, Chapter 8 concludes with a few closing remarks on network security and NETSPA's
role within that realm.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter describes the background, terminology, and tools necessary to understand
the basic issues involved when combating computer and network intrusions. Section 2.4
explains attack graphs and their importance to network administrators in creating secure
networks, and Section 2.5 enumerates important types of existing network security software
and information systems, several of which are used to import information into NETSPA.
2.1 Introduction to Vulnerabilities and Exploits
Security administrators are primarily concerned with detecting and fixing software vulner-
abilities before they are exploited by outside attackers. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in
software packages and systems that allow the software to operate outside of designed bound-
aries. Exploits then utilize vulnerabilities to gain otherwise inaccessible information and
privilege. Vulnerabilities, and to a lesser extent, exploits, are well documented in online
security databases such as the ICAT Meta-base [4] and the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures [2] list. In addition, these databases have been used to help characterize the
frequency at which software vulnerabilities are found and subsequently fixed [16].
Software vulnerabilities generally arise from basic system complexity and bad program-
ming practices, as is the case with most buffer overflows. Other vulnerabilities, however, are
inherent in the software design or arise from mis-configuration. For example, FTP trans-
mits login and authentication information "in the clear" via an unprotected channel. ICAT
provides several distinctions between vulnerabilities, such as the necessary position of an
attacker relative to the target host and the consequences of an exploited vulnerability.
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Vulnerabilities can exist in software long before they are found by other users. In [16],
the authors concluded, using open information such as that found in ICAT, that the rate of
new vulnerabilities found in a high profile software packages, such as a web or DNS server,
is between 0 and 7 per year. While this may seem almost inconsequential, when an entire
organizational network and all the hundreds of pieces of associated software is taken into
account, new vulnerabilities should be expected on a weekly basis.
Exploits take advantage of software vulnerabilities to gain information and privilege.
Exploitation of the FTP service could involve listening, or "sniffing," the network to obtain
packets destined for another machine. The login information can then be read straight from
these plain-text packets, granting an attacker the ability to log into the FTP server and
masquerade as a legitimate user. Another exploit of the same FTP server could involve
sending specially crafted input that causes the server to execute arbitrary commands at the
privilege level of the FTP server.
Software exploits are characterized based on the level of privilege provided and the
necessary location of the attacker relative to the target host. Local exploits are those
that can only be accomplished when on the same machine as the vulnerable software,
whether by being physically at the terminal or logged in remotely. In contrast, remote
exploits allow an attack to be executed from a remote location, only necessitating a network
connection between the attacker and the vulnerable software's port. Successful exploits
generally provide the attacker with privilege equal to that of the running program.
The most common and well studied vulnerabilities and associated exploits arise when
a programmer accepts input from a user and copies it into a buffer not big enough for the
input. In general, correct practice in such a case is to truncate the input to a size that fits
within the buffer. In the past, many programmers simply made the buffer large enough
to fit everything that they thought was reasonable and blindly copied the input into it.
Clever security analysts, however, found out that it was possible to give the incorrectly
written software a piece of data larger than the buffer size, thus overflowing it, and writing
to unauthorized places in memory. With a little knowledge of the computing architecture
and stack, it is then possible to hijack the program to execute arbitrary code with privileges
equal to that of the running program [15]. This is known as a buffer overflow. One reason
that buffer overflows are so well known is that they are relatively common and easy to
exploit. If the vulnerability is evident in a network program, it often can lead to remote
13
compromises.
Another instance of incorrect input validation is evident in format string errors. Exploit-
ing one of these vulnerabilities has the same effect as exploiting a buffer overflow, allowing
the attacker to run code with the privileges of the program. The format string exploit is
enabled, however, due to the incorrect handling of format strings, such as those passed to
C functions printf and sprintf. Specially crafted format strings allow a user to write to
arbitrary points in the program's memory. These sorts of vulnerabilities are less common,
however they do occur and can be exploited [32].
Logic errors comprise a nefarious class of vulnerabilities that can't quite be pigeonholed.
Some are simple mistakes in coding, such as not handling a boundary case or not ending a
loop at the right time. Others can be complex, as in not providing a mechanism to handle a
special input case. Logic errors tend to be overlooked because the program works correctly
under normal conditions and only resorts to incorrect behavior with special case inputs.
While buffer overflows and format string exploits generally give the attacker privilege on
the machine running the vulnerable software, logic errors behave in numerous ways when
exploited. An exploited logic error might release information from the computer, change
a local file, or simply crash the software. For example, a naive web server that does not
correctly parse the character ';' could allow an attacker to remotely download any file inside
of the web server's configuration directory. Another prime example of logic errors is found
in race conditions. Multiple asynchronous threads of computation sharing data provide a
haven for slight mistakes that might show up if a certain pattern of behavior or certain
timing is enacted.
Several other types of computer attacks exist that don't categorize well to specific vul-
nerabilities. Some types of denial-of-service (DOS) attacks attempt to send requests to a
piece of software faster than the system can handle them. This flooding can prevent the
attacked software from responding to valid queries coming from other agents, thus rendering
it useless. While a DOS attack does not gain an attacker any sort of direct access into the
network, it is extremely easy to create, difficult to protect against, and can cause businesses
to lose money due to the server down-time.
Possibly the most naive attack available, a brute force attack, attempts to enumerate
through all of the possible combinations of input to try and find something that "works."
The most common example of such an attack is in password guessing. An attacker can
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simply enumerate all of the possible combinations of letters and numbers until the right one
is found. While this could take an incredibly long amount of time, brute force attacks can be
sped up with any sort of prior knowledge. In the password guessing example, the attacker
might first try all of the letters in the person's name, as well as numbers in his birthday
and social security number, checking for weak passwords. Similar brute force attacks can
be made against cryptographic keys and other authentication information.
Finally, worms comprise another class of computer attacks. Worms are malicious pro-
grams that automatically exploit known system vulnerabilities and then use compromised
hosts as launching stations for additional automated attacks. Examples of such attacks
are the Code Red [5] and Nimbda [35] worms, which propagated by exploiting Microsoft's
Internet Information Service (IIS).
2.2 Protecting Against Network Attacks
Numerous ways exist to protect against computer attacks. The most obvious solution is
to simply fix the problem in the software and eliminate the vulnerability. While this is
also the best solution, several hurdles exist in changing vulnerable software. First of all,
attempting to understand and correct all of the hundreds of programs that run on all of the
computers in a network is often infeasible. Also, not all software packages are distributed
with source code, so it is likely that only the software vendor has the required access to
change the behavior of the software. Even if the software vendors fix all of the problems
within their respective software, there is still a window of time (sometimes large, depending
on the vendor) where the unfixed, vulnerable software is being used and the exploit is known
[16]. Once an update is distributed, it is then necessary for the network administrators to
find all of the computers that are running the previously vulnerable software and apply the
update.
While fixing vulnerabilities in software is the "correct" way to protect against network
attacks, the feasibility of using this as the only form of network protection is highly ques-
tionable. Other solutions have been developed to protect against software exploits in the
face of numerous software vulnerabilities, even those that are still unknown. One trivial
and effective mechanism is to simply deny access to the software from unknown sources.
This can be accomplished by totally disconnecting the internal network from any outside
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networks. As mentioned previously, this solution is inconvenient and often impossible for
most organizations to accomplish. Firewalls and their derivatives provide a more common
way of denying access to certain software. Packet-based firewalls block network traffic based
on criteria about network packets, including origination and destination IP addresses, port
numbers, and, in the case of more complicated firewalls, protocol type and packet content.
Firewall rules can be set up to block access to software that is running on a certain host-port
combination, effectively blocking access to that piece of software across the firewall. While
these rules are quite effective, correctly setting up and managing a firewall is a difficult task,
especially for large internal networks and complicated security policies.
2.3 Anatomy of a Network Attack
A network attacker executes a series of steps to reach a desired goal. The order and
duration of these steps is dependent on several factors including attacker skill level, type
of vulnerability to be exploited, amount of prior information, and starting location of the
attacker. The attacker's steps range from finding out about the network via port scans,
running exploits against the network, cleaning attack evidence, and installing back doors
and Trojan software to guarantee easy access to the network at a later date.
There are three basic actions taken by an attacker when executing a computer attack:
Prepare. During this stage, the attacker collects network configuration information using
port scanners, banner grabbers, and sniffers. The most important pieces of informa-
tion are computer IP numbers, operating systems, and open ports with their associated
listening software type and version.
Exploit. The attacker has identified a vulnerable piece of software and attempts to exploit
it during this stage. This is where the attacker gains privileges and information
required. The intruder may execute multiple attacks during this phase.
Leave behind. Once the attacker has obtained the required access level via exploitation,
the intruder often installs additional software to allow easy access to the network
in the future. Such "leave behinds" might be Trojan software, network sniffers, or
additional back-door network services.
Cleanup. At this stage, the attacker attempts to clean up any evidence left by actions
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completed in the previous stages. This includes restarting daemons crashed during
exploitation, cleaning logs and other information, and installing modified system soft-
ware designed to hide the presence of other software from normal system commands,
such as ps and top.
The existence and duration of each phase of an attack depends partially on the skill
and nature of an attacker. At the bottom of the skill totem are the "script kiddies," novice
computer users who download sample exploits from Bugtraq [31] or other vulnerability web-
sites. They then use these exploits and attempt to run them on entire networks, without
regard to whether the target system is actually running the vulnerable software. This
behavior is usually very "noisy," meaning that it is easily detectable by most intrusion
detection systems and appears in most of the log files on the target computer. In addition,
if the exploit fails, it often causes the vulnerable software to crash, leaving a trail of failed
attacks that is easily traceable back to the attacker. Script kiddies generally spend little
time in any stage other than the exploitation stage, as they are more entranced by the
"coolness" of "hacking" and have no real intrusion goal other than compromising many
systems.
As an attacker increases in knowledge, the amount of time spent in preparation and
cleanup phases increases considerably. In addition, the types of attacks executed begin
to favor those that do not crash the target software, leave little trace that the machine
was ever attacked, and are invisible to intrusion detection systems. Finally, the number of
attacks within the exploit phase also increases, as skilled attackers will ofter use a series of
seemingly low-level attacks to continually upgrade access levels.
Once an attacker advances beyond the realm of the script kiddie, the intruder often has
a specific goal in exploiting the network. Whether this goal is to deface a website, obtain
pre-release software, or something more nefarious like stealing credit card numbers, the
attacks are more likely to be specifically targeted at a certain objective, rather than simply
trying to get into the network. This goal directed behavior, coupled with an attacker's
knowledge, leads to multi-component attack paths that traverse several hosts on the path
to the goal state.
Other factors, such as initial location of the attacker, prior network information, and
type of exploit also determine the amount of time spent in each stage of an attack. For
example, an attacker that begins an attack within an organization's internal network has
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remote buffer overflow local suid buffer install trojan
against webserver overflow telnet daemon
Attacker Host Target Host Target Host Target Host
root webserver root root
Figure 2-1: An example attack path.
access to a much broader range of network information and connectivity, allowing for quick
preparation, whereas an outside attacker requires more time to determine the same amount
of network information. Similarly, different exploits require more or less cleanup, depending
on how noisy the exploit was, and whether it crashed the vulnerable software.
2.4 Attack Graphs
Attack graphs are a concise way of representing network attacks. Each component attack
comprises a transition between two states. A series of attacks then represents a directed
path. All the attack paths against a network can be merged to create an attack tree. This
attack tree can then again be collapsed into a single graph by combining like states and
presenting them to the administrator. Such a graph allows an administrator to determine
the most probable attack paths and most security-influential hosts and vulnerabilities by
analyzing the "bottlenecks" in the graph.
The nodes of an attack path represent the current state of the system. This includes the
current privilege level of the attacker, previous privileges on all machines in the network, and
all of the modifications to the network made by the attacker. In the sample attack graph of
Figure 2-1, the nodes depict merely the current host of the attacker and the current access
on that host, however, the entire state is assumed to exist at each node.
The directed edges of an arc correspond to the actions taken by an attacker including
exploits, scans, remote logins, etc. Each action models a state transition. For example, in
Figure 2-1, the attacker first executes a remote attack against the web server of the target
host and obtains the same privileges as the web server. The intruder then proceeds to
exploit a local program that runs with root permissions to obtain administrator access on
the target. Finally, the intruder installs a Trojan telnet daemon to ease any later access
into the network. The actions performed to transition from one state to another need not
simply be exploits, but could be as innocuous as scanning the network or "pinging" a host.
In general, there are many different attack paths for any given network topology. The
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against webserver overflow telnet daemon
Target Host Target Host Target Host
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Target Host Target Host Target Host
ftpd root root
remote buffer overflow local suid buffer install trojan
against ftpd overflow telnet daemon
Figure 2-2: An example attack tree.
remote buffer overflow
against webserver
Target Host local suid buffer
webserver overflow
Attacker Host Target Host Target Host
root root root
Target Host ocal suid buffer install trojan
f tpd overflow telnet daemon
remote buffer overflow
against ftpd
Figure 2-3: An example attack graph.
number of paths grows quickly as the network grows, since more machines translate to more
vulnerabilities. All of the possible attack paths can be trivially collapsed into a tree with
the same root node, as in Figure 2-2. This attack tree can then be further collapsed into
a graph after noting that there are replicated states within the tree. Several combinations
of attacks might arrive at the same privilege level and network state. In Figure 2-3, this
is shown after the local suid exploit, at which point both of the paths in the graph have
root access on the target host. It is important to note that, even though each path in the
graph at one point has another type of access (web server, ftpd), once administrator (root)
access is achieved on the target host, this is irrelevant. We assume that the exploits did
not crash the respective servers, otherwise, this graph would be incorrect, and the resulting
state after the local suid exploit would be different, as one path would have a crashed ftpd
and the other a crashed web server.
Construction of an attack graph requires several pieces of information about the type
of attacker, underlying network topology, and number and type of attacks available to the
attacker. Figure 2-4 illustrates these input components. Only three inputs, the attack
model, network and host vulnerabilities, and network topology are essential to the creation
of a useful attack graph. The attack model defines the state transition relation of an attack
by stating its requirements and effects of executing an attack. The network topology limits
the physical paths that an attacker can traverse within the network, subject to network
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Network Topology Intrusion Host and Network
hosts, software, Detection Systems Vulnerabilities
firewall rules, etc. placement,
Attack Graph
Attacker Profile Critical Network Attack Model
level of expertise, Resources
desired goal, etc. databases, requirements,file servers, etc effects
Figure 2-4: Information necessary to create an attack graph.
connectivity and firewall rules. The host and network vulnerabilities and configurations
define the possible set of initial actions that the attacker can take against the network using
attacks from the attack model.
The other three inputs to the attack graph, attacker profiles, intrusion detection systems,
and critical network resources, are not required to generate an attack graph, however they
increase the utility of the constructed graph. The attacker profile defines the starting state
of the intruder, as well as the methodology that the attacker uses in choosing the next
attack to execute. This enables the administrator to optimize a network's security against
novice outside attackers, while accepting the possibility of an insider attack. A list of critical
network resources also allows the security administrator to prune the complete attack graph
to only those states which are judged critical, such as not allowin attacker access to a central
billing database. Finally, the placement and type of the intrusion detection systems allow
the graph generator to determine which paths are visible.
The resulting attack graph of a network is a valuable security tool [33]. Ideally, the
attack graph contains all of the possible paths that an attacker can take through the net-
work, pruned to those of most interest to the security administrator. An administrator
can then easily identify critical states that the attacker should be kept out of, and proceed
up the graph to find ways to combat the attacker. For example, in Figure 2-3, it might
be imperative that the intruder not get root access on the target host. The administrator
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can locate the first states in the graph at which the attacker obtains root, and then trace
the graph upward from there to find the paths the attacker traversed. In our example, the
administrator can tell that both of the paths use the local suid exploit to upgrade privileges
from a user to root. Simply by removing or fixing this program, the attacker can be stopped
from further exploiting the network. In a real situation, however, remote access of any kind
is a much more dangerous threat than a local privilege upgrade, therefore the administrator
might opt to fix both the web server and the FTP server. If fixes aren't available, the servers
could be turned off or firewalled, again preventing attacker access from the outside. Once
the administrator is satisfied with the fixes, the attack graph can be recreated to determine
whether the fixes provided any new vulnerable access points.
Attack graphs can also be used to enhance general security. If the attack graphs do not
provide any attack paths to critical network resources, several general security metrics can
be gleaned from the structure of the graph. For example, an action that is repeated many
times within graph can be construed as being an easy, and perhaps necessary, exploit for an
attacker. Eliminating this vulnerability can provide an increased level of general security
within the network as a whole, in the face of new exploits.
It is important to limit the type of actions allowed within an attack graph to keep it
simple enough to be analytically useful. For example, if we allowed the command is (the
UNIX "list files") as a valid action, we would create many singleton cycles within the graph,
obfuscating the more important information. There is thus a trade-off between the number
and type of actions and the usefulness of the resulting attack graph. When too many actions
are allowed, the graph becomes fraught with cycles and meaningless paths. Too few, and
the graph does not encapsulate enough attack behavior necessary to combat intruders.
While attack graphs are a necessary security tool, creation has often been done by hand.
This is tedious, time consuming, and error prone, as graphs for large networks can be quite
large and complex. NETSPA automates much of the attack graph generation procedure,
while also providing a reusable framework for constructing graphs on a variety of networks.
2.5 Existing Security Software and Resources
NETSPA uses information from a wide variety of existing security sources as input to
its graph generation procedure. Each of these sources provides a necessary graph input
21
component, however alone they do not have the capability to construct a complete and
useful graph.
2.5.1 Software Vulnerability Repositories
Several repositories of software vulnerability information exist on the Internet in the form of
databases, newsgroups and web-sites. Possibly the most famous and widely used is Bugtraq
[31], a mailing list hosted by SecurityFocus [30] frequented by all of the major software
vendors and security organizations, as well as many individuals. Here security organizations
and individuals post new software vulnerabilities and sample exploits as evidence of an
actual problem, sometimes in excess of a hundred messages a day.
CVE, the Common Vulnerability and Exposures list [2], is an attempt to create a "list
of standardized names for vulnerabilities and other information security exposures." This
standardized naming scheme allows information about various vulnerabilities to be shared,
cross-referenced, and distributed. CVE attempts to categorize more than simply software
vulnerabilities, but also exposures, those actions taken by an attacker that don't directly
compromise the target system but provide additional information to the attacker, such as
a network scan or finger probe.
The ICAT Meta-base [4] uses the CVE naming scheme to provide a great deal of meta-
information along with the attack names and descriptions. This meta-information includes
the locality of the attack, type of vulnerability, exploitation consequence, and several others.
In addition, ICAT provides links to possible patches and updates that fix the vulnerability.
Vulnerability information repositories, such as CVE, ICAT, and Bugtraq, generally con-
tain enough information to create the necessary state transition model of an attack, possibly
the most important input to an attack graph generator. On their own, however, these repos-
itories do not have the computational ability to turn the natural language descriptions of
attacks into a valid computational model of the form required to generate an attack graph.
NETSPA thus utilizes the meta-information and descriptions from the information sources
to enable a user to create the attack model.
2.5.2 Port Scanners
Port scanners occupy an important place at the low end of the security spectrum. The port
scanner is a remote tool that attempts to connect to a computer in a variety of different
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ways. If a connection is accepted on a certain port, the port scanner then knows that there
is software listening on that port. From this, a user can infer what programs are running on
the target system. In addition, full featured port scanners such as nmap [11] can use clever
packet creation and response to make a guess about the operating system type and version.
By cleverly crafting the probe packets sent to a remote host, a run of nmap can be almost
invisible to a probed computer. This sort of technique can force the target software to
respond, but not initiate any sort of connection. A good port scanner can compute a fairly
accurate view of the network topology, however it has no notion of software vulnerabilities
or attacks, and thus cannot be used alone to construct attack graphs.
2.5.3 Vulnerability Scanners
Vulnerability scanners are, in principal, one of the more basic forms of security software.
A scanner first collects information about a computer, such as IP address and software
versions, by attempting to remotely connect to the host and note what ports and services
are available, similar to a port scanner. In addition, several scanners support "banner-
grabbing" techniques that actually connect to the target host and note the data (banner)
that is returned by the listening application. In the case of a web server, the default banner
often tells the type, version, and operating system of the target computer. If the scanner is
being run on the same host that is being scanned, a more extensive amount of information
can be gleaned and local software is often cataloged. Next, the scanner compares this
information against an internal database of known vulnerabilities and the user is flagged
when a match, signaling a vulnerability, is found. Nessus [8], a full-fledged security scanner,
supports its own scripting language and currently has a database of over 1000 vulnerabilities.
SU-Kuang [27], a local scanner, and Net-Kuang [38], a networked version of SU-Kuang,
scan for configuration vulnerabilities, those weaknesses created by incorrect configuration
of various software components. Their database is not explicit vulnerabilities, such as buffer
overflows and denial of service attacks, but invalid configurations. The biggest weakness
of security scanners is that they only identify single point system vulnerabilities, and fail
to extrapolate this information to find attack scenarios and graphs. In addition, most
vulnerability scanners do not have a notion of action effects, only the requirements necessary
to execute the action.
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2.5.4 Intrusion Detection Systems
IDSs do not prevent attacks from occurring, but instead attempt to detect them as they
occur by analyzing behavior. Snort [28], for example, an open source network-based IDS,
compares network traffic against an internal database of known attack signatures. When a
match is found, Snort generates an alert. Host-based IDSs, such as USTAT [37] and Zone
Alarm [39], can detect attacks, including buffer overflows, by determining when software
components perform functions that are not part of their normal specifications, such as
changing passwords or connecting to the Internet. It is then up to the user to determine
whether an actual attack is occurring, or whether the alert is a false alarm. Reducing
the incidence of false alarms while keeping the detection rate high is one of the primary
research areas of most intrusion detection systems. An IDS is typically a second line of
defense, however some security policies require that certain functional "holes" remain in a
network, and an IDS provides another level of protection and confidence in the security of
a network by detecting when these "holes" are used.
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Chapter 3
Related Research
Generating attack graphs is not a novel idea. Several systems have been developed to auto-
matically create attack graphs, and several languages exist to describe attack components.
This chapter details these systems, and examines the strengths and weaknesses of each
against the methods employed by NETSPA.
3.1 Attack Languages
Quite a bit of effort has gone into creating languages to break down computer attacks into
reusable components and create standardized attack descriptions, such as what an attack
requires in order to run, and what the effects of the attack are on the network and the state
of the attacker.
The STATL language, described in [9], was designed to assist intrusion detection systems
in detecting attack scenarios. In addition, a major design goal of STATL was to be able
to link together both new and existing attacks into a scenario. To this effect, STATL
necessarily abstracts away much of the low-level system details, such as software versions,
that are necessary when creating attack graphs using real networks. It has, however, been
successfully used as part of the STAT intrusion detection framework [37] to describe many
attacks. The Snort signature language [28] has also been used to create attack signatures. In
fact, Snort signatures can be converted into the STATL language to populate the NetSTAT
IDSs with signatures [10].
LAMBDA [7] is another language designed to work hand-in-hand with intrusion de-
tection systems. LAMBDA allows a scenario to be built incrementally from increasingly
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complex modeled actions, using pre- and post-conditions. Each scenario must be pre-defined
by hand and LAMBDA does not have any native support for automatically combining at-
tacks to create an attack scenario. Also, like STATL, LAMBDA is intrinsically tied to
intrusion detection systems, and has recently been used to correlate IDS alerts as they are
received into scenarios [6].
In [24], Ramakrishnan and Sekar propose a new object-oriented modeling language,
where each aspect of a system is modeled as a communicating "object." This allows a
model of an entire system to be built, at which point the model can reason about possible
conditions in which a vulnerability would arise. This type of language is adept at discovering
configuration vulnerabilities, as well as those vulnerabilities related to the inherent design of
the system. Simple vulnerabilities, however, such as specific buffer overflows, are beyond the
scope of the model. Finally, modeling each system in a large network to include file-systems
and all running processes would take a tremendous amount of time, and be computationally
infeasible to simulate quickly. A recently proposed language called CAML [1] shares this
complexity, but evidently it has yet to be applied.
JIGSAW [36] is a requires/provides language designed to join atomic attacks together
to create scenarios, with the "provides" section from one action enabling the "requires"
section of another attack. The requires/provides ideas behind JIGSAW are very similar to
those in the language developed for NETSPA, however JIGSAW fails to describe essential
state transitions, such as modifications to the state of the network. In addition, JIGSAW
has only been demonstrated on a small number of attacks.
REM, the simple language developed for NETSPA, uses to notion of requires/provides
as state transition elements. In addition, REM is very simple to allow for quick and easy
modeling of a large number of actions.
3.2 Attack Graph Generation Systems
Because attack graphs are so difficult to create by hand, several graph generation systems
have been developed. These systems tend to be very similar to NETSPA in terms of
generating attack graphs, but most have limitations that NETSPA attempts to overcome.
In [26], the Ritchey and Ammann create a simplified state model of an attack and use
specialized model checkers, such as SMV [18] and SPIN [13] to prove counter-examples to the
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assumed security of the modeled network. This has the advantage of using existing model
checkers to quickly and efficiently obtain results. The model itself, however, was little more
than an extension of a security scanner's database; it modeled only simple configurations
of each host and used the current access level as state. While this model works for many
attacks, there are whole classes of attacks that this ignores, such as sniffing traffic on a
network. Also, an attack graph is not generated, only the single path that contradicts the
original assertion. This does not allow the security administrator to reason about the overall
security of the network, only the existence of a single path from attacker start state to a goal
state. Finally, entering the initial network topology information and host vulnerabilities was
all done by hand, coding directly in the model checker's state transition language. This
large setup cost is prohibitive for normal security administrators.
In a similar vein, Sheyner et al. also use a modified model checker to create attack
graphs [33]. The authors modified the NuSMV [3] system to generate a list of all of the
possible counter-examples to their hypothesis, such as "root access on host A is never
achieved." This provides a sub-graph of the entire attack graph such that every path ends
in a state that violates the original hypothesis. As this model checker works from a goal
state backwards, the state space explored by the graph generator has the potential to be
smaller than that explored by a similar forward chaining algorithm. This can result in
time and space savings, however the additional information found in the complete graph
containing all of the possible attack goals requires many passes of the system, one for each
goal. Despite the efficiency promised by a model-checking system, the NuSMV system
required 2 hours to compute a graph on a network with only 4 hosts and 8 possible attacks.
This run might be intractable for larger and more realistic networks.
The work by Sheyner et al. improves considerably over previous model checking graph
generators by allowing the network configuration information to be entered using XML
structures, as opposed to the native language of the model-checker. The state transition
actions, however, must still be programmed directly into NuSMV. The authors acknowl-
edge this issue, and are attempting to create a repository of attacks and actions. NETSPA
attempts to overcome this sort of limitation by enabling an extremely simple attack def-
inition language that greatly simplifies the task of creating and distributing new attacks
and actions. In NETSPA, the attack information is entered as a series of statements into a
simple database instead of adding code using a model-checker's native language.
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The software described by Swiler et al. in [34] is the most similar to NETSPA. The
system generates attack graphs using a forward chaining algorithm and also takes into
account basic network topology. Each action is modeled as a template that can "fire" if
certain conditions are met, and each action rewrites the network to change the state. The
authors also assign several cost metrics to each action, and attempt to highlight all paths
within a given E of the shortest path. This attack model, however, is overly general and has
only been shown to work on a very small network of two hosts and five possible actions.
Also, the network topology model fails to depict several network fundamentals, such as
firewalls and routers. Finally, the authors employ several graph pruning techniques, such
as redundant path elimination, to turn the final attack graph back into a tree. This loses
important security information in the process such as additional paths to a goal state.
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Chapter 4
NetSPA Design
NETSPA was created to fill a void in existing security software. The primary design goal of
NETSPA was to create a system that could automatically compute complete attack graphs
for real, user-specified networks. This, in turn, lead to three separate sub-goals: allow a user
to easily define a network and its resulting configuration, enable quick modeling of realistic
actions, and efficiently compute worst-case attack graphs with sufficient meta-information to
be easily useful to the user. Secondary to the notion of attack graphs was that of simplicity
and information reuse, most notably in the action specifications.
The definition of a network includes many separate components. Each host must be
individually defined with running software, ports, and connectivity to a network through
interfaces. In addition, hosts can behave as a gateway or firewall and can contain a set of
rules to limit the traffic allowed across the gateway host. A host may also behave as a host-
or network-based intrusion detection system. Finally, trust relationships between hosts can
be established to model normal user traffic.
The worst-case graphs generated by NETSPA illustrate all possible cyber-attack paths.
They do not model physical attacks or human engineering attacks. Graph generation does
not take into account the skill or predisposition of the attacker. It also assumes that
attempts at "security by obscurity," such as passing SMTP traffic through the firewall on
a non-standard port, fail. In addition, the model of an IDS is assumed to be "best-case."
A host-based IDS always detects an attack launched against it, while a network-based IDS
always detects attacks that are visible on the network if it has a signature for the attack.
NETSPA is divided into several modules to achieve its goals, each component and re-
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sulting connectivity is shown in Figure 4-1. As seen in the upper left of the figure and
illustrated in Section 4.1, the software database is the repository of software information
used by NETSPA to make software names consistent. The software database is used by both
the action database (Section 4.2) and the input filters to the network model (Sections 4.5
and 4.4, respectively) to create a consistent software naming scheme among network config-
uration and action definitions. The action database shown in the middle left of Figure 4-1
contains information about every possible action that an attacker can execute against a
user-defined network. The creation of this network is aided by the use input filters, shown
in the upper right of Figure 4-1, which populate the network model with network config-
uration information. This network model is then used to create an initial network state,
which is provided, along with the database of possible actions and set of existing trust rela-
tionships (Section 4.3), to the computation engine (Section 4.6). The computation engine
then creates a worst-case attack graph for the specific set of inputs.
4.1 Software Database
The software database contains records of all software run on all hosts within the network.
This includes operating systems, network daemons, and applications. The software database
exists primarily as way to enforce consistency in software names between the input filters
and the action definitions. For example, a version of the popular Windows operating system
might be written as "Windows NT 5.0" or "Windows 2000." The software database contains
a single record that embodies all of the different "spellings" of a piece of software, allowing
the computation engine to function on software indices, as opposed to names. The database
can be populated directly from the software list distributed with the ICAT database. As
much of the action information is also derived from ICAT, the ICAT software list should
be complete against all of the actions within CVE.
4.2 Action Database
The action database is the primary repository of information about all of the types of actions
that can be executed, including network scans, remote logins, exploits, Trojan installation,
and other behavior common to computer attacks. Every action that can be performed
on a network must exist within the action database to allow NETSPA to use the action
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Figure 4-1: NETSPA component diagram.
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in constructing an attack graph. Additionally, each action's transition behavior must be
modeled for NETSPA to know how to join actions together into a graph. As there is
currently no central database of machine parseable action definitions, each action must be
entered into the database manually. The simple attack language chosen for NETSPA was
designed to facilitate quick attack modeling, allowing a substantial database of actions to
be entered without significant effort. Also, an action only needs to be entered once into the
database, which can then be shared among many users. The attack language designed for
NETSPA was inspired by several existing attack languages, including those of [7, 36]. The
following section discusses this language.
4.2.1 Attack Model: Requirements/Effects/Modifies
The model used to define the possible action state transitions is one of the most important
pieces of the system, as this defines the expressiveness of each action. Too specific and the
model will fail to capture many of the important actions that an attacker can take; too
general and the feasibility of implementation drops significantly. For example, a language
that can only model direct remote root attacks will fail to comprehend the more subtle
attacks, such as modifying a .rhosts file to allow remote unauthenticated logins from any
host. Alternately, a language that is overly complex for the domain, such as that found in
[24], will require the user to create definitions for every piece of the system, including files
and permissions of an entire file-system.
The Requirements/Effects/Modifies (REM) keyword language was created to model the
requirements of an action, as well as the effects of the action once it is performed. This
simple language allows an action to be specified in terms of its state transition behavior.
The REM language has three components: requirements for the successful completion of
an action, effects on the state of the network and attacker knowledge, and modifies to the
current attacker privilege and login state. A more thorough description of the language is
given in Appendix A.
Each time an attacker attempts to perform an action, certain conditions must be met
for the action to succeed. For example, if the attacker cannot even connect to a machine
within the network, possibly because of a firewall, then the attacker cannot execute a remote
attack against the protected machine. Similarly, an attacker cannot exploit a local program
until logged into the host where the program resides. The conditions necessary for an action
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to be successfully performed are the requirements of that action.
Each successfully completed action affects a change on the state of the network. For
example, a remote buffer overflow of a network service such as sshd will most likely cause the
service daemon to crash, while an .rhosts exploit might establish a trust relation between
two hosts, allowing the a user on one to log into the other host without any password or
additional authentication. This network state change is the effects section of an action's
REM specification.
Finally, an action can modify the current state of the attacker, including privilege level
and current host. If an attacker logs into another machine, the current host and user are
modified to that of the new machine and new user. This is considered a modification of the
attacker state, and is part of the modifies section of an REM definition.
A complete REM action definition is a set of statements divided into the three previously
described sections: requirements, effects, and modifies. The statements within each section
are unordered. A sample REM definition for a remote root-level sshd overflow is shown
in Figure 4-2. The capital words are the keywords of REM that define the information
contained within the statement. Words within <> are variables that are bound at the
time of action execution. Quotation marks are also required for all string literals within a
statement.
In the requirements section, there are two statements which define the necessary state
of the network for the action to complete. The first of these statements is a RUNS clause,
indicating that the <target.host>, the host against which the action is being performed,
must be running the correct software, as defined by the software signature
OpenBSD:OpenSSH Server:2.3:2.3.5 b37
The signature of a piece of software is simply a string of the form
vendor:product name:common version:exact version
Software can also be defined as TYPE software.type, where sof tware.type defines a valid
type of software, such as "remote login server." There can only be a single RUNS statement
matched within the requirements section of an action. Multiple RUNS clauses can exist within
the requirements to allow for an attack that works over several versions of the software. The
single matched piece of software binds the <exposedsoftware> and associated running
<port>. This port is set to zero if it is a local application. Any additional software that
is necessary for the action to complete can be specified using ALSO-RUNS clauses, with the
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same syntax as a RUNS statement.
The other statement within the requirements section is the CANCONNECT statement,
which specifies the necessary network connectivity. In this case, <currenthost>, which
is bound to the host that the attacker is currently logged into, must be able to connect
to <target-host> on <port>, the port that the exposed piece of software is running on.
In this case, this is most likely port 22, the standard sshd port, but could be any port on
which there is an sshd of the correct signature.
The effects section only contains a single statement. This statement modifies the state
of the <exposedsoftware> (sshd), and forces the software into DOS mode, which is an
undetermined state meaning that the software is not accepting new connections, whether
due to a software crash or a denial-of-service attack.
Finally, the modifies section changes the <currenthost> of the attacker to be the
<target-host>, and the <currentuser> to be root on the new machine. There are four
different access levels within NETSPA: none, nologin, user, and root. Privilege level none
provides no access at all on the target host; user has access equivalent to a normal user
of the system; root corresponds to having full control over the target host. The nologin
user is equivalent to having knowledge about the users of the system but no way to log
in, perhaps because of a missing password or a closed account. This user type is often the
precursor to a brute-force password breaking attack.
There are many systems with several different access levels that cannot be described
by REM. In addition, there are several actions that cannot be exactly defined with REM.
The majority of the user groups and actions can be correctly expressed using only the three
user groups provided and the simple REM statements. For those few actions that require
a more specific language or user definition, it is possible to model the action to be less
restrictive, and then allow the user to manually filter this extraneous data. For example,
an action that provides 'guest' account access on a Windows 2000 host can be relaxed from
the actual action into an action definition that provides 'user' level access. Similarly, an
action that allows a user to modify the /etc/passwd file on a UNIX system can be said to
provide root access, even though the actual action does not directly give root access. This
relaxation of actions results in the creation of additional nodes and paths in the final attack
graph that do not necessarily map to real-world situation. As NETSPA strives to provide
worst-case attack graphs, this was deemed an acceptable trade-off for the simplicity of the
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sshd Remote Buffer Overflow
Requirements <target.host> RUNS "OpenBSD:OpenSSH Server:2.3:2.3.5 b37"
<currenthost> CANCONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Effects <target-host> RUNS <exposed.software> DOS
Modifies <currenthost> = <target-host>
<currentuser> = root
Figure 4-2: The REM definition for an sshd remote buffer overflow.
REM language.
Two more keywords exist within the REM language that are not in the previous ex-
ample: HASACCESS and TRUSTRELATIONSHIPS. When used within the requires section, a
HASACCESS statement requires that a user Uj on host Hi must have access U on host H
for the action to complete. A HASACCESS statement within the provides section implies a
trust relationship between the two hosts, enabling the attacker to remotely log in to host
H from Hi without additional authentication. The TRUSTRELATIONSHIPS keyword can be
placed in the effects section of an action definition, and provides the attacker with the abil-
ity to obtain all clauses in the set of trust relationships, described in the following section,
originating from hosts on the current subnetwork. This provides worst case data capture
functionality as an attacker will obtain all of the remote login information immediately for
the purpose of generating a worst-case graph and finding actual system vulnerabilities, even
though, in a realistic situation, the capture of all of the required information might take
days or weeks.
4.3 Trust Relationships
The trust relationships, shown in the bottom right of Figure 4-1, are input provided by the
user that define the allowable remote authentications between hosts. This is primarily used
to model essential user traffic, such as a user obtaining mail via POP or an administrator
remotely logging into a DNS server. It is assumed that the authentication mechanisms are
point to point and directed, i.e. a specific user can only log in to the mail server from a
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specific host, but not the other way around. Trust relationships represent all authenticated
user traffic between hosts in the network. The relationships are a set of REM HASACCESS
statements that enumerate the allowable host-to-host user transitions. For example, if a
user, who normally works at host "apple", is allowed to remotely authenticate from "apple"
to another host "pear" with user permissions, the following statement would exist in the
list of trust relationships:
user ON apple HASACCESS user ON pear
These trust relationships allow NETSPA to model the the behavior of an attacker at-
tempting to capture user-entered data. It is assumed (as a worst-case) that an attacker
with a network data capture device, such as a sniffer, can obtain all user authentication
traversing the network. As explained previously in Section 4.2.1, an attacker that installs
a sniffer will be able to detect and read all of the network traffic modeled in the trust rela-
tionships originating on the same subnetwork as the position of the sniffer. Since the trust
relationships are point-to-point, however, the attacker must obtain the necessary privilege
level on the "start" host to be able to transition, using the trust relationship, to the pro-
vided privilege level on the "end" host. In our previous example, a sniffer installed on the
same subnetwork as host "apple" would learn that a user on "apple" could log in as a user
to host "pear." The attacker would have to first obtain user access on "apple" in order to
be able to authenticate to "pear" using this trust relationship.
This model of network data capture assumes that all of the traffic on the network
subject to capture by the attacker is sent "in the clear," i.e. unencrypted, and that all of
the the remote authentication servers use some sort of access control list (ACL) to limit
the allowable user/host login combinations. The ACL behavior is due to the point-to-point
nature of the trust relationships. In a realistic situation, a remote login server might not use
an ACL, meaning that a valid remote user could log in from any host. This ACL behavior
cannot be concisely modeled using the REM syntax. A workaround that enables modeling
of a non-ACL server is to create trust relationships from all "local" user machines to the
remote login server. For example, a valid set of organizational trust relationships would
allow all internal machines on an organization's network to connect to the mail server as
user. This would be the equivalent of allowing users to check their mail from any machine
on the internal network. This is not entirely correct, as non-ACL servers would permit valid
logins from an attacker's host. The trust relationships attempt to model actual worst-case
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user behavior and establishing such a relationship between unrelated hosts would violate
this model.
The trust relationship model can be extended to include SSH, SSL, and other secure
protocols by requiring the privilege level at the start of all such connections to be root.
This assumes that encrypted network transmissions can only be compromised as root on
the source machine using a local key-stroke monitor or other such techniques. If the previous
trust relationship example modeled a secure login, the statement would become:
root ON apple HASACCESS user ON pear
This is slightly ambiguous and taken to mean that either an administrator can log in from
"apple" to a user on "pear," or that a user on "apple" is transmitting over the network using
a method that cannot be directly read, and requires that some form of local data capture
be used on "apple" with administrator permissions. A necessary and useful enhancement
to NETSPA would be to augment the syntax of the HAS-ACCESS REM statement to directly
support encrypted transmissions. This would also require additional software types listing
those servers that support encrypted transmission, and was deemed unnecessarily complex
for the initial tests of NETSPA.
The list of existing trust relationships is created by the user after the network has been
created. Currently, the user must input the statements directly into NETSPA, however
inputs could be read from a database of configuration file in the future.
4.4 Network Model
All of the network topology information is stored within the network model. Every piece of
information about the network must be present within the model for NETSPA to make use of
it. This includes hosts, software running on each host, network connections, subnetworks,
firewall rules, and intrusion detection system placement and capabilities. This network
information can be imported from outside sources using provided filters and the software
database, or entered directly by hand. The computation engine later imports all of the
information contained in the network model into a collection of objects that compromise
the initial state of the network.
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4.5 Input Filters
The input filters provide mechanisms to easily populate the network model with information
about the network. Filters can take different forms. For example, a Nessus filter that
populates the software information for the hosts might be a perl script that matches hosts
based on IP address. NETSPA's primary input filter, however, is a NetViz [22] ODBC
interface to the network model. NetViz allows a user to create a graphical drawing of a
network with all of the necessary configuration information as shown in Figure 4-3, and then
export the topology information to the network model, in our case, a database. NetViz was
chosen because of the large body of NetViz users who already create models of their network
within NetViz. With only minor modifications to existing network diagrams, NetViz can
automatically populate the network configuration information.
4.6 Computation Engine
The computation engine is the heart of NETSPA and is responsible for searching through
all of the possible attack states to generate the attack graph. This is accomplished by
using actions as state transition elements in a rule-based artificial intelligence system. The
computation engine takes inputs from the action database and the initial network state
and attempts to match the current network configuration, attacker information, attacker
privilege state, and the requirements of each of the actions in the database. If a match is
found, the computation engine makes sure that the action provides a new, useful state to the
attacker, and, if so, calls a grapher (described in the next section) to create a new node using
the currently matching action as the joining arc. This process continues recursively until
no additional matches can be found in the network state, at which point the computation
engine backs up to the previous state and attempts to execute other actions.
A forward chaining rule-based Al system was chosen for NETSPA for several reasons.
Most importantly, this implicitly enforces the state sequencing inherent in the REM lan-
guage. Because an action's requirements must be met before the action can be executed,
an action will not be performed until additional actions are executed that provide the nec-
essary state. This intrinsic action behavior lends itself directly to rule-based AI systems.
In addition, a snapshot of the entire state of the system must be kept at each node in the
graph, which invalidates the use of simple network algorithms, such as shortest-path ap-
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proaches. It is also simpler than model-checking and more formal methods, as well as being
more feasible. In real networks, there will only be a few reachable states and NETSPAwill
compute paths in a relatively short amount of time, or the entire graph will not be useful
to view and only statistics on paths a few actions long are necessary to demonstrate the
insecurity of a network. A limited depth forward search will thus either quickly find the
few reachable states or provide information about the explosion of the graph after a limited
depth search.
The state explored by the forward chaining algorithm can potentially be much larger
than that traversed by an algorithm that works backwards from a goal node. The extra
security information that can be gleaned from a graph of all possible paths into a network is
significant, and a forward chaining algorithm was selected for implementation. In addition,
if the state space is very large and computationally intractable, a forward chaining algorithm
can explore the tree, limiting itself to a certain depth, and still provide useful information
about the network's security. One goal of this thesis was to determine if simple forward
chaining could provide useful and novel information required to design secure networks.
4.7 Grapher
The grapher is simply an interface that receives calls from the computation engine to con-
struct a graph based on the actions executed and the state at each point in the execution.
The grapher is also responsible for collapsing the tree provided by the engine into a graph
by combining equal states, as described earlier. Finally, the grapher performs any pruning
for a specific goal state as required by the user.
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Chapter 5
NetSPA Implementation
NETSPA is comprised of several different parts, each of them implemented in a slightly
different way. The complete system engine is written in C++ and runs on Red Hat Linux
7.1 [25] using MySQL 4.0.1 [21], unixODBC 2.2.0 [12], and John Maddock's Regex++
regular expression libraries from the C++ boost package [17]. To enable the use of NetViz
[22] for inputting network configuration data, we used Windows XP Professional Edition
[19] and NetViz 6.0 connected to our Linux database server via ODBC.
The rest of this chapter discusses the more interesting implementation details of the
various system components, including a description of the different database structures and
resulting models, the basic algorithms used in the engine, and the graphing process.
5.1 Databases
The action database, software database, and network model are all implemented using
a relational database system. This was done for several reasons, primary among them
universal access and ease of modification. Open source RDBMS systems can be accessed
in many different ways and the information contained within can easily be easily shared
between many different people and applications. In addition, each of the databases has the
potential to get very large, and RDBMSs provide a fast and elegant interface into managing
large data sets.
The three logical databases together comprise a single physical database, the Network
Security Database (NSD). Each NETSPA "database" is represented as a collection of tables
within NSD.
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5.1.1 Action Database
The action database, as shown in Figure 5-1, is comprised of five tables. Each table contains
its own unique integer primary key that can be used to reference the table via other foreign
keys. A sample entry into each of the action-related tables is presented in Figure 5-2. The
nsd-actions table functions as the primary action table that contains all of the basic infor-
mation about the action. Within nsd-actions, the cve-id defines the CVE identification
of the action, if one exists. The description is a large text column that allows a com-
plete natural language description of the attack to be entered. The locality-inf ormation
determines the necessary position of an attacker relative to the target host, "remote" or
"local" are the only two current localities. The icat-severity is a text description of the
severity of the action as imported from the ICAT Meta-base, and numeric -severity is the
numeric value equivalent. The publish-date is the date that the action or vulnerability
was made public, and date-entered the date that the action was entered into NSD. Finally,
idsdetectable is a boolean value that determines the action's visibility to a network-based
IDS. There is no equivalent for host-based IDSs as it is assumed that all attacks impinging
on a host are visible to a host-based IDS. Much of the information in nsdactions can be
imported directly from a dump of the ICAT database via provided custom perl scripts.
The nsd-action-types and nsd-action-action-types-map provide a way to type and
categorize actions for further meta-information. An example action type could be "buffer
overflow" or "race condition." This information would be entered succinctly in the type-name
field of nsd-action-types and more descriptively in the type-description column. The
nsd-action-action-typesminap table simply provides a way to map the type keys to the
action keys.
The nsdirequires, nsd-effects, and nsd-modifies tables contain the REM state-
ments necessary for their respective action, mapped via a foreign key column in each table.
The requisite REM statement is placed in the statement column of the respective table,
and the action-id field maps to the action key.
The action database can only be partially automatically populated. Most of the meta-
information can be obtained through CVE and ICAT. The REM modeling information,
however, must be entered by hand for each action. This is where the value of a simple
modeling language is shown, because the time to enter in a new action is small, compared
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nsdactions
-> +action id: INT >7
+cveid: CHAR(13)
+action-name: VARCHAR(255)
+action-description: TEXT
+locality: VARCHAR(20)
+icat-severity: VARCHAR(20)
+numeric-severity: INT
+reference info: TEXT
+publishdate: DATE
+date-entered: DATE
+idsdetectable: BOOL
nsdi-action-types
I- >+tvroe id: INT
+typename: VARCHAR(255)
+type description: TEXT
I,
nsd action-action-types-map
-+action-id: INT
- - +tvoe id: INT
I-
I-
nsd-requires
+reauires id: INT
- - - +actionid: INT
+statement: TEXT
nsd modifies
+modifies id: INT
- - - +actionid: INT
+statement: TEXT
nsd-effects
+effects id: INT
--- -+action-id: INT
+statement: TEXT
I
Figure 5-1: Action related tables within the Network Security Database.
nsdactions
+action-id: 12
+cve-id: CVE-2001-0803
+action name: CDE dtspcd overflow
+action-description: buffer overflow in the client ...
+locality: remote
+icat-severity: High
+numeric-severity: 100
+reference-info: http://xforce.iss.net/alerts ....
+publish-date: 12/6/2001
+date-entered: 5/20/2002
1+ids detectable: true
nsciaction types
+type-id: 54
+typename: Buffer Overflow
+type description: A buffer overflow is ....
nsdactionaction types-map
+actionid: 12
+tye id: 54
nsd-requires
+requires-id: 101
+action-id: 12
+statement: <target host> RUNS "-:dtspcd:- : -"
nsd_modifies
+modifies-id: 22
+action id: 12
+statement: <currentuser> = root
nsdeffects
+effects-id: 56
+action~id: 12
+statement: <target host> RUNS <exposed software> DOS
Figure 5-2: A sample entry into the NSD action related tables.
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to the other models discussed in section 3.1.
Unlike the network database, the action database stands almost entirely alone and is
independent of the network that NETSPA is being run against. This allows all of the
NETSPA users to contribute new actions to the database, and allows the database and
models to be used for other purposes not directly involving NETSPA. There is, however, a
dependence on the constancy of the software database, discussed in the next section.
5.1.2 Software Database
The software database, seen as the tables within the gray box in Figure 5-3, is made up of 3
tables: a table to hold the meta-information such as the vendor and product key, a software
types table, and a mapping table to link the two. Like the action database, the software
database is separate from the actual execution of NETSPA, allowing the data to be shared
among all NETSPA users. A sample entry into the software tables is shown in Figure 5-4.
The nsd.sof tware table contains a primary key (sof twareid) to uniquely identify each
piece of software, and the vendor, product-name, common-version, and exact-version
columns identify the software vendor, name, public version numbering, such as the "5.1"
in "Microsoft IIS 5.1", and precise versioning, including patch and build level, respectively.
The nsd-software-types and nsd-software-software-types-map define a software type
(in fields type-name and type.description) for possible later reference in an action REM
definition. For example, in order to execute a remote login action, a target host must be
running a "remote login server," such as rlogin, a telnet server, or an SSH server. Figure 5-
4 describes such a mapping between the "CDE" software and "Desktop System" software
type.
The records within the software database need to remain static for NETSPA to func-
tion correctly. This is due to the fact that statements in the action database refer to a
specific signature within the software database that needs to be constant among all runs
of NETSPA. To illustrate what can happen when this is not the case, assume that a new
action was created and modeled using the software signature
Open Group:Common Desktop Environment:1.2:1.2.31 p2
which maps to a valid record within the software database. If the Open Group later changes
its names to "Open Software Group" and this update is made in the software database, the
action does not map to a valid record within the database. This can result in an action
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nsd software
-+software id: INT
+vendor: VARCHAR(255)
+product-name: VARCHAR(255)
+description: TEXT
+commonversion: VARCHAR(255)
+exact version: VARCHAR(255)
Snsd-software-types
+type_name: VARCHAR(255)j
+type_description: TEXT
nsd softwaresoftware-types-map
- +type-id: int
I +software id: int
nsd-networks
r-3K+network id: INT
I +name: VARCHAR(50) -
+description: TEXT
ii
ii
II
II
ii
ii
II
ii
II
II
II
nsdfirewalls
+firewall id: INT
- -+gateway-host-id: INT
+frominterface id: INT
+to interface-id: INT
Ionrt: INT
___________________ IN
nsd hosts
->-+host id INT >
- -+networkid: INT
+description: TEXT
+gteay BOOL nsd interfaces
+default-open: BOOL _____________host-ids: BOOL r> +interface id: INT
+net-ids: BOOL -r - +network-id: INT
- - -+host-id: INT
-t - +subnetworkid: INT
nsd subnetworks i +name: VARCHAR(50)
+subnetwork id: INT - I +hostname: VARCHAR(50)
- -+networkid: INT I +domainname: VARCHAR(50)
+network: VARCHAR(50) -
+netmask: VARCHAR(50)
Figure 5-3: Software
database.
(gray) and network topology related tables within the network security
nsdsoftware
+software-id: 298
+vendor: Open Group
+product-name: Common Desktop Environment
+description: CDE is a desktop system ...
+conuronversion: 1.2
+exactversion: 1.2.31 p2
nsdsoftwarejtypes
+type-id: 302
+type-name: Desktop System
+type description: A desktop provides ....
nsdsoftwaresoftware types-map
+type-id: 302
+software.id: 298
Figure 5-4: A sample entry into the NSD software related tables.
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nsd-host software map
+hostsoftwareMapid: INT
+hostid: INT
- +software-id: INT
+interface-id: INT
+port: INT
--------------------- a
I
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
path not being explored because the software signature did not find a match. For these
reasons, the index and signature of a piece of software need to remain constant among all
runs of NETSPA to allow for the sharing of the action models in the action database. Also,
the initial entry of software into the software database can be almost entirely automatically
generated from the ICAT software list.
5.1.3 Network Database
The network database is the highly dynamic repository for configuration information of
specific networks to run against NETSPA. This information can be entered directly into
the database or imported from filters, such as NetViz, into the six tables. The network
database is shown as the non-grey parts of Figure 5-3 and a sample entry is given in
Figure 5-5
The nsd-networks table is the highest level of the network hierarchy, and simply contains
a way for many different networks to exist within the database, providing a primary key
(network-id), name (name), and textual description (description) of the network.
The nsd-hosts table contains a list of all of the hosts, referenced to their particular
network using a foreign key mapping in network-id. The host also contains boolean columns
that describe its state as a gateway (gateway), default firewalling rule (def ault-open), and
performance as a host- or network-based IDS (host-ids and net-ids respectively).
The nsd-f irewalls table defines more rigorous firewall behavior in the form of rules. A
rule provides a connection opposite to the default behavior. For example, if the default be-
havior is closed, a firewall rule would define a valid connection between two host interfaces.
Conversely, if the default firewall was open, a rule would specify a denying of the path be-
tween two interfaces. A unique table ID (f irewall-id) is provided, as well as the connection
port number (port). The other two columns, frominterfacejid and to-interfaceid,
determine the start and end interfaces, as foreign keys into nsd-interf aces, that the rule
refers to.
At the same level as a host in the network hierarchy are the subnetworks, defined
in nsd-subnetworks. The subnetworks are primarily used as a hub for connecting hosts
together, and only define their respective networks (network) and netmasks (netmask).
The nsd-interf aces table defines the linkage between the hosts and subnetworks via
the host-id and subnetworkjid fields. Additionally, the interface contains a name in the
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nsdnetworks
+networkid: 1001
+name: 4th Floor LAN
+description: A LAN being operated ....
nsdhostsoftwaremap nsd hosts nsdfirewalls
+host-software_mapid: 6954 +host-id: 2345 +firewall-id: 5555
+host-id: 2345 +networkjid: 1001 +gatewayhostid: 2345
+software eid: 298 +description: Gateway +from -interface-id: 42
+interface eid: NULL +gateway: true +to-interface-id: 45
+port: 0 +default-open: false +port: 80
+host-ids: false
+net-ids: false
nsd-interfaces
+interface id: 52
nsd subnetworks +network-id: 1001
+subntwor-id:3001 +host-id: 2345+snetworkid: 3001 +subnetworkid: 3001
netw+raid: 1001
+network: 192.168.0.0 +n : 1 68
+netmask: 255.255.0.0 + tn9 16 eway-internal
+domainname: vulnerable.com
Figure 5-5: A sample entry into the NSD network configuration related tables.
name field such as "xlO," an IP number in ip, a host name in hostname, and a domain name
in domainname.
Finally, the nsd-host-software-map designates the software running on a particular
host. Since the software could also be running only on a specific interface and port, this
information is also included in the map table in the interf aceid foreign key reference and
the port column. Local software, such as an operating system or local application, would
have a NULL value in place of the interface and 0 as the port number.
5.2 Internal Object Models
Before the computation engine begins, all of the information is read from the databases
into local C++ objects via a database manager that interfaces to ODBC. The C++ classes
closely parallel the database table structure. The following classes are almost identical to
their respective database tables, with additional accessor and mutator methods: Network,
Host, Interface, Subnetwork and Software. The types tables are enfolded within their
respective primary class. Also, the foreign key references within the table define "contains"
relationship between the objects. For example, a Network object contains Host and Subnet
objects, and a Host object contains Interf ace objects. The map tables define a pointer
linking, such as that between a Subnetwork and an Interf ace.
All of the connectivity information is contained within the Connectivity data struc-
ture, which is is a matrix of boolean values between interfaces and listening interface-port
combinations. The information is derived from the foreign key connections contained within
47
the database. This is accomplished by running a modified depth-first search of the network,
once starting at each of the hosts in the network. Each of the firewalling gateways traversed
along the way add their rules to the connectivity. Each run of the depth-first search adds
a row to the matrix (Interf ace x Interf ace:port), and each rule along the path per-
taining to the start host is also added. This technique limits the handling of multi-homed
hosts, dynamic network connectivity, and re-routed network connections and would be an
important future enhancement for NETSPA.
5.3 Computation Engine
The computation engine implements a rule-based AI scheme to link the possible states
in the network and then and searches through them with a recursive, depth first search.
The primary search algorithm for NETSPA is illustrated by pseudo-code in Figure 5-6. In
short, the computation engine uses an AttackState object, described in the next section,
to encapsulate state of the attack. The compute attack-graph() method iterates through
each of the hosts in the network and each of the actions. Within this double loop, NETSPA
determines whether the existing state of the attack supports all of the requirements of the
action. In addition, NETSPAdetermines whether the effects and modifies of the algorithm
provide new useful state and warrant execution. If all of the conditions are met, a copy of
the state is created and the action is performed on the copy. The grapher is then called to
add the new state to the graph. The addNode () method, described further in section 5.3.1
returns whether the state created by performing the action is a new state (true) or whether
the same state was already reached by another path (false). If the state is new to the
graph, then the algorithm recurses, passing on the new state. This results in a depth-first
traversal of the possible state space, while maintaining a dynamic state at each point in the
process. Once all of the possible host/action combinations for a particular state have been
exhausted, the algorithm updates the grapher with a backup() call and returns from this
level of the recursion. In addition, a limit can be placed on the depth of the recursion to
prevent the graph from becoming too large and taking excessively long to generate.
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void compute-attack-graph(Network net, ActionList actions, AttackState state, Grapher graph)
for(int i = 0; i < net.hosts.size(); i++)
{
for(int j = 0; j < actions.sizeo; j++)
7/ make sure that the action's requirements are met and
/7 that the action provides novel state
if((actions j].requires == state) && (actionsj].effects != state))
AttackState newState = state.perform(actions Di);
// check to see if state has been seen before within the grapher
if(graph.addNode(newState, actions[j]))
/7 recurse
compute-attack.graph(net, actions, newState, graph);
}}}}
graph.backupo;}
Figure 5-6: The basic search algorithm used by NETSPA.
5.3.1 Attack State
The attack state object (AttackState) contains all of the changes to the privilege and
network state, as well as the necessary mechanisms for determining whether an action
should be executed. This includes all of the updates to the software on all of the hosts, the
changes to the network connectivity, the current attacker host and privilege levels on each
host, and several other pieces of state information.
The AttackState class contains several containers of internal objects that keep track of
the state of the attack. The Connectivity object specifies new network connections enabled
through the use of a CANCONNECT statement in the effects section of the action definition.
Runs objects store any changes to software running on the hosts, including starting up or
shutting down systems or modifying the state of existing software. Finally, the HasAccess
objects store any new trust relationships added to the state. Additional state, such as the
previous privilege levels on all the hosts is stored in several simple associative map variables
within AttackState. Each state also has a unique ID number to enable the user to match
the graph to a key of information.
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The action statements are processed within the AttackState using regular expres-
sions to match and return the useful information and attempt to match it to the local
state. The primary RUNS statement within the requires section of the action defines the
<exposed- software> and <port> and is necessarily matched first. The additional state-
ment variables, <currenthost>, <target.host>, and <currentuser>, are already set by
the computation engine and the existing state.
5.4 Graphing Subsystem
The Grapher class provides an interface for the computation engine to invoke a graphing
method. Grapher contains five methods that all graphing systems must implement in order
to comply with the interface. The Grapher is constructed with the starting state as the
root node. After that, calls to addNode(AttackState* node, Action* edge), insert the
state as a node into the graph and join it to the graph with the passed action as an edge.
This process connects the "current" node to the new node. The addNode 0 method returns
a boolean value as to whether the added node produced a new node within the graph, or
just a new linkage between the current node and an existing node of the same state, which
would occur if the same state already existed within the graph. The current node is always
the node that was last added to the graph, unless the backup() method is called, at which
point the new current node becomes the latest visited parent of the existing current node.
Once the computation engine has exhausted all of the possible paths, the prune (GoalSt ate
g) method can be called with a particular goal state, at which point the Grapher prunes all
paths that do not end with the goal state. Also, getStats 0 returns a string representation
of the statistics of the graph, such as all the privilege levels obtained at each of the leaf nodes,
software modified on the leaf nodes, number of graph nodes and number of graph edges.
Finally, once the entire graph has been generated and pruned, a call to flush(ostream&
out) method writes the graph to the output stream defined by out.
Currently, NETSPA only implements a single grapher, the GraphVizGrapher that pro-
duces a file that can be read and translated by the open source graphing package graphviz
[14]. GraphVizGrapher operates by keeping a node list and two separate node-node map-
pings: a child adjacency list and a parent adjacency list. Both of these mappings allow
non-unique keys, making a full directed graph possible. Each time addNode 0 is called,
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GraphVizGrapher first checks to see whether the same state already exists within the graph.
If it does, a new parent-child mapping is added to the end of each of the map objects, using
the existing current node as the parent, and the existing "same" node within the graph as a
child, which is also then set to the current node. False is then returned to the computation
engine. If the node being added is actually new, it is added to the set of nodes and the
parent-child mappings are constructed between the current node and the new node. The
current node then becomes the newly added node, and GraphVizGrapher returns true.
Once backup() is called, the current node is set to the parent that has been most recently
traversed, which is kept track of by a simple "most recent parent" vector.
The prune() method takes a GoalState as an argument and excises the graph based
on this goal. The GoalState object contains information about the desired user, host, and
visibility. For example, a goal state could be obtaining root on Host-A and being invisible
to intrusion detection systems. The goal state pruning is done with a depth first traversal
(DFS) of the attack graph, comparing the state at each node against the goal state. If a
match is found on a leaf node, no further pruning needs to be done for this path, and the
DFS continues. If a goal state match is found on a non-leaf node, all of the ancestors of the
current matching node are removed from the graph. Finally, if an entire path is enumerated
and no goal state is found, all of the single children predecessors along the path from the
root node to the current non-matching leaf node are deleted.
The basic GraphVizGrapher pruning method is shown in Figure 5-7. A sample DFS
traversal (without pruning) of the tree results in the nodes being examined in the order
labeled. Node 3 matches the goal state (denoted in grey) as a leaf node, and so the DFS
continues. Node 4 matches the goal state and has children, at which point the arcs {4, 5}
and {4, 6} are deleted, as well as node 4. Node 6 contains a parent reachable by another
path, and therefore remains for this pruning iteration beginning at node 4. As arc {4, 6}
was just deleted, the next nodes examined in the DFS are 7, 8, and then 6. Since node 6 is
a non-matching leaf node, it is deleted recursively, along with each of its parents that have
only a single child. In this case, only node 6 and arc {8,6} are deleted, as node 8 contains
another child other than 6. Finally, node 9 is examined, determined to not match the goal
state, and nodes 8 and 9, and all necessary arcs are deleted, resulting the the graph shown
in (b).
The NETSPA graph generation scheme produces an incremental collapse of the attack
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2. 7
(a) (b)
Figure 5-7: Illustration of graph pruning techniques used in NETSPA. The grey nodes
denote the first matching goal state. (a) describes the full graph and (b) after the graph is
pruned.
tree and allows NETSPA to save on computation time. This is primarily due to the fact that
NETSPA does not need to explore the paths that touch existing states within the graph,
as they have already been explored previously, due to the depth-first search nature of the
computation engine. The pruning mechanism, however, is not incremental, and requires
that the entire graph be generated and then pruned back to a goal state.
An alternate graph generation and pruning mechanism would rely on searching the
graph in a breadth-first manner. This would enable the pruning to be done incrementally,
while the collapsing of states would necessarily need to be accomplished after the entire tree
in generated. We believe that entire attack graph provides valuable security information,
and have thus optimized NETSPA for this goal.
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Chapter 6
Running NetSPA
The following chapter describes the output of NETSPA against two separate networks and
action sets. The first section, 6.1, describe the steps necessary to provide NETSPA with
the information needed to run, such as the software and network configuration. Section 6.2
shows a sample run of NETSPA against a very small network, taken almost directly from
[33]. This was used primarily to provide performance and correctness comparisons for
NETSPA. It also makes it possible to demonstrate several features of NETSPA using rel-
atively small, easy to view graphs. Section 6.3 describes runs of NETSPA against a much
more realistic and complete small business network, complete with DMZ and realistic fire-
wall rulesets. The design of this network is modified to show the effect of combining DMZ
servers into a single host, changing security policies, and installing IDSs. In this network,
NETSPA quickly discovered a security weakness in the system that the administrators had
not previously considered.
6.1 NetSPA Setup
NETSPA requires several pieces of information before a run of the system. First of all,
the action and software databases must be created and populated with all of the necessary
actions and software that NETSPAuses to transition between attack states. Several scripts
exists within the NETSPA package that provide the SQL (for MySQL) necessary to cre-
ate the requisite database structures. As previously mentioned, the software information
is imported from ICAT, and the action database is currently manually created with the
appropriate attack models. To show that each action was correctly modeled, a test net-
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work was created where each action correctly matched against only a single host. For later
NETSPA users, these models could be distributed as a library of actions and associated
software that could be easily imported into a local user's databases.
Once this is complete, the user must specify the network configuration within the net-
work section of the database. NetViz provides a convenient and intuitive way to access this
database through a data-driven graphics display. The user simply creates a test network
within NetViz and fully specifies the software running on each host. The NetViz interface
and sample network creation was previously shown in Figure 4-3.
Three additional pieces of information can be entered by the user to allow NETSPA
to generate more specific attack graphs: firewall rules, trust relationships between various
users and hosts, and a goal state that defines a critical host/privilege/visibility tuple. In
addition, the recursive depth limit can also be set by the user. Currently, the trust rela-
tionships, goal state, and depth limit information is entered directly into NETSPA via a
command line interface. If the inputs are not provided to NETSPA, the default behavior
is dependent on several factors. The behavior of the firewall defaults to that specified in
the host configuration table within NSD. If no trust relationships are specified, then the
installation of a sniffer does not provide any information to the attacker. If a goal state is
not given, NETSPA generates a complete graph of all of the possible actions against the
network for a given depth. Finally, in the absence of a depth limit, NETSPA attempts to
exhaust the attack tree. The firewall rules are currently entered directly into the network
database, however adding this functionality to the NetViz interface in the future would be
useful.
6.2 Simple Network
The simple network, shown in Figure 6-1, is useful in showing several basic properties
of attack graphs generated by NETSPA as the resulting graphs are relatively small and
tractable. The network contains only five separate hosts: an attacker host, a firewalling
gateway, Host-A running an FTP server, rlogin service, and a local suid program, Host-
B, running an FTP server and an SSH server, and an optional network-based intrusion
detection system.
In addition to the network, the action database is populated with five actions, summa-
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E1Host-A
ftp server, port 21
girewayg rlogin service
attacker atw[ylocal suid program
Host-B
ftp server, port 21
Nto IDssh server, port 22
Network IDS 0
Figure 6-1: A simple network.
rized in Table 6.1. The remote login action is simply that, a login of a user from one host
to another. There are two versions of the sshd overflow, one visible and one invisible to any
network intrusion detection systems on the path from source to target host, in this case, the
IDS host placed before the firewall. The action is a remote buffer overflow in the SSH server
process. Since sshd runs with root privileges, this provides the attacker with root access
on the target host. The FTP .rhosts action stems from a configuration vulnerability. If
the FTP server allows public upload access, it is possible to create a .rhosts file in the
home directory of the FTP user, thus establishing a trust relationship with a remote host.
This enables a remote user to log into the target computer through the rsh service without
authentication.
The full attack graph produced by a single run of NETSPAis presented in Figure 6-2.
Each of the optional inputs, firewall rules, trust relationships, goal state, and depth, was
left to their respective default values. Each node is labeled first with a unique ID number.
This permits comparison to a description of all the states present in the graph and to later
pruned graphs. As NETSPA is entirely deterministic, if the graph is regenerated with the
same inputs, all of the state IDs will by identical. Each node also displays the current host
(Att = Attacker Host, HA = Host-A, HB = Host-B) and privilege level of the attacker. For
example, S: 144, HB root means that the attacker has obtained root privilege levels on
Host-B, which corresponds to state 144. The arcs model an action taken by the attacker,
and are labeled with the action number and the target host. For example, 4(HA) means
executing the FTP .rhosts action against Host-A.
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Figure 6-2: The full attack graph for the simple network.
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Action Name Locality Visibility Requirements Effects
1 remote login remote visible a connection to the moves the attacker to
remote host and user- the remote host with
level or greater access given privilege level
2 sshd overflow remote visible a connection to a run- moves the attacker to
ning SSH server the remote host with
root privileges
3 sshd overflow remote invisible a connection to a run- moves the attacker to
ning SSH server the remote host with
root privileges
4 FTP .rhosts remote invisible a connection to a run- establishes a trust
ning FTP server relationship between
the current and
target host
5 local overflow local visible host is running vul- provides root access
nerable local suid on host
program
Table 6.1: List of possible actions against the simple network.
Each node corresponds to a unique state. NETSPA generates a key with the attack
graph to enable an administrator to determine the full extent of the attacker state at each
node in the graph. Each key entry describes a snapshot of the entire state of the attack up
to that point. A sample entry in the key for a single node is shown in Figure 6-3. The key is
fairly self explanatory, and simply lists all of the changes to the initial state of the network,
including the current host and user level, whether the attack has been seen by an IDS, all of
the past hosts and access levels of the attacker, established trust relationships, changes to the
running software, changes to the connectivity, and user-defined trust relationships. In the
previous example, the attacker is currently on Host-B with root access, and has previously
been on Host-A with user access. The attacker has also established trust relationships
between the attacker host and Host-A and Host-B. Finally, a previous action (sshd overflow)
has caused the SSH server on Host-B to be put into the DOS state.
A specified goal state will prune the full graph to contain only paths leading to that
state. The goal state is a definition of a non-allowable state for the attacker; a state that
the security administrator is most interested in protecting against. This is illustrated in
Figure 6-4, with the goal being undetected root access on Host-A. As there is no IDS, the
visibility portion of the goal state does not matter. Each leaf node in the figure matches
the goal state and all other extraneous nodes and arcs have been pruned away.
NETSPA can also use action visibility and placement of intrusion detection systems to
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State ID:544
Current Host: Host-B
Current User: root
Already seen by IDS: false
Primary Attack Host: attacker
Past Users:
attacker/root
Host-B/root
Host-A/user
Has Accesses:
From attacker/user To Host-A/user
From attacker/user To Host-B/user
Running Software:
Host:Host-B Software:SSH server Port:22 DOS
Existing Trust Relationships:
Connectivity:
Figure 6-3: Sample state at a single node as output to the node key.
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Figure 6-4: An attack graph for the simple network, pruned to the goal of root on Host-A.
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alter attack graphs. For example, assume that the primary goal of the administrator is
to prevent root access on Host-A, or, if root access is unavoidable, to be able to detect
an unauthorized entry with an intrusion detection system (IDS). The administrator then
wishes to evaluate the benefits incurred by either installing a network IDS between the
firewall and the internal subnet, or placing a host based IDS on either Host-A or Host-B.
For comparison, the entire attack graph was again created with a single network IDS
between the firewall and external subnet and is shown in Figure 6-5. The graph looks very
similar to the full graph without the IDS, however, the states that have been currently or
previously seen by the IDS are shown in grey. The visibility of the attack now modifies the
state, resulting in a difference between how the two different sshd attacks are drawn.
Figure 6-6 shows the full attack graph from Figure 6-5 pruned to contain only paths
that are not visible to the network IDS. This smaller graph enables us to determine several
interesting properties about the possible routes to the goal state. For example, action 3,
the stealthy sshd overflow, against the secondary host is required on every path from the
start state to every leaf, whereas action 4, the FTP .rhosts configuration exploit, against
the secondary host only appears as a predecessor of three of the four leaf nodes. This allows
us to conclude that removing or upgrading the SSH server could prevent the goal state
from being reached. Adding a host IDS to Host-B pruned the graph only slightly from the
original, while adding a host IDS to Host-A resulted in no graph at all, meaning that the
entire graph was pruned away because there was no way for the attacker to get to the goal
state using the given actions, without being detected by the IDS.
The above results were performed on a network that was identical to that used in [33].
Attack graphs were compared to those presented in [33] and found to be fundamentally
identical except for small differences in the way the graphs are constructed and displayed.
These results confirm the accuracy of the graph generation algorithms, at least for this small
network. In addition, the running times on such a small network were comparable, about 5
seconds in each case, showing that NETSPA is at least as fast as the model checker used in
[33]. These results also show that a formal model checker is not required to generate attack
graphs.
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Figure 6-5: The full attack graph for the simple network with states in grey being visible
to a network IDS.
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Figure 6-6: An attack graph for the simple network with a network IDS, pruned to the goal
of achieving undetected root access on Host-A.
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Figure 6-7: A sample realistic small organization network.
6.3 Realistic Network and Sample Execution
The realistic network was modeled directly from an actual small organization network.
Nessus was used to scan a network, and a subset of the resulting hosts, host software, and
vulnerabilities were used to create the network. Multiple hosts with similar vulnerabilities in
the original network are represented as a single host within the network model. A complete
list of the vulnerabilities modeled is provided in Appendix B. This realistic network makes
it possible to show how NETSPA allows a security administrator to design a secure network
in simulation before any hardware is purchased, software upgraded, or security policies
changed. Even though the resulting attack graph was often too large to view easily, NETSPA
still provided important security information.
The network is illustrated in Figure 6-7. It is comprised of primarily three sections. First,
there is the outside network, where there exists only a single host, the outside attacker,
akin to a host on the Internet. Next, there is a demilitarized zone (DMZ) where the
publicly accessible servers are contained. Finally, there is the internal network where the
organization's private users and computers reside. This is a standard method for dividing a
network, as it places the high profile and high risk public servers in a separate section of the
network. The theory is that the security administrators will focus on the security of the few
public computers and not have to concern themselves with the security of every computer
in the private network. In most situations, the number of DMZ servers is relatively small
compared to the number of internal hosts, making this an attractive security solution.
Each computer's software configuration is outlined in Table 6.2. This shows that, while
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the DMZ public servers will often have the latest software and patches installed, the com-
puters within a private network are often much less secure. Also, the DMZ mail and DNS
hosts are running a remote login service (sshd) to enable a user from within the private
network to remotely administer the machines.
Dividing each of the three network sections is a firewalling gateway with several rules
to prevent unauthorized access between the different parts of the network. These rules are
summarized in Table 6.3. Basically, these rules allow an outside host to only connect to
the computers in the DMZ on their respective public server ports (25 for SMTP, 53 for
DNS, and 80 for HTTP) to access the organizations web page, send mail to someone within
the organization, or lookup a DNS name hosted by the organization. The mail and DNS
servers can connect to the internal server named "apple" to forward incoming mail and
provide DNS lookup responses. Internal hosts can also connect to the DMZ web server on
port 80. Finally, there is a single host name "otter" that can connect to the mail and DNS
servers in the DMZ via SSH on port 22, allowing an internal user on "otter" to remotely
administer the DMZ servers. It is also assumed that the DMZ web server is administered
locally, and has no need of a remote administration service.
There are several questions that a network administrator might have about this network.
For example, what can a novice attacker using existing vulnerabilities accomplish if starting
from outside the network? What if the novice attacker was inside the network? What if
the attacker had the capability to develop new attacks? Would the security of the network
be enhanced by combining the three DMZ servers onto one machine? Where is the optimal
placement of intrusion detection systems in order to catch both novice and expert attackers?
What internal machines are most influential in the overall security of the network? Each of
these questions is evaluated in the following sections.
6.3.1 Novice Computer Attacker
The novice computer attacker uses known vulnerabilities found on general security infor-
mation repositories such as ICAT and Bugtraq. A list of these vulnerabilities and their
associated REM definitions is given in Appendix B. The security administrator wishes to
evaluate the proposed security of the current network against both insider and external
novice attackers.
A run of NETSPA against the network starting at the outside attacker host yields a tree
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Host Name Interface Software Port
Outside Attacker local none necessary
attacker-host(6.6.6.6)
Firewalling Gateway local none (hardware)
gateway-external(1.2.3.4)
gateway-internal(192.5.0. 1)
gateway-dmz(10.0.0.1)
Web Server local Microsoft Windows 2000
webserver(10.0.0.11) Microsoft IIS 5.0 HTTP 80
Mail Server local RedHat Linux 7.3
mailserver(10.0.0.12) OpenSSH 3.2.2 22
Sendmail 8.12.3 25
DNS Server local FreeBSD 4.6
dnsserver(10.0.0.13) OpenSSH 3.2.2 22
BIND 9.2.1 53
Internal Router local none (hardware)
router-external(192.5.0. 1)
router-internal(192.5.135.1)
Inside Attacker local none necessary
inside-attacker(192.5.135.66)
Penguin local RedHat Linux 5.2
penguin(192.5.135.101) Wu-ftpd 2.6.0 21
generic telnetd 23
BIND 8.1.2 53
generic rlogin 514
generic rpc.nfsd 2049
MySQL 3.20 3306
Otter local RedHat Linux 7.2
otter(192.5.135.102) OpenSSH 2.9 22
generic rpc.statd 32768
Blue local Microsoft Windows 2000 Advance Server
blue(192.5.135.111) generic telnetd 23
Microsoft ESMTP 5.0 25
generic smb 139
generic snmp 161
generic rpc.nfsd 2049
Green local Microsoft Windows ME
green(192.5.135.112) Microsoft IIS 5.0 FTP 21
Microsoft IIS 5.0 HTTP 80
generic smb 139
Purple local Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
purple(192.5.135.113) generic X11 server 6000
generic smb 139
Apple local Sun Solaris 2.7
CDE 2.2
apple(192.5.135.121) Wu-ftpd 2.6.0
SSH 1.2.27 22
generic telnetd 23
Sendmail 8.10.2 25
BIND 8.1.2 53
Apache 1.3.9 80
PHP 3.0.18 80
Qpopper 2.53 110
generic snmp 161
generic rlogin 514
MySQL 3.22 3306
generic dtspcd 6112
Prune local Sun Solaris 2.6
prune(192.5.135.122) Sendmail 8.9.3 25
BIND 8.2.2 p 3  53
Plum local Sun Solaris 2.6
CDE 1.2
plum(192.5.135.123) SunOS FTP Server 5.6 21
Sendmail 8.8.8 25
ntpd 4.0.99k 123
generic rlogin 514
MySQL 3.22 3306
generic dtspcd 6113
BW-A local HP Laserjet
bw-a(192.5.135.201) HP JetDirect 161
Color-A local Tektronix Phaser 840
color-a(192.5.135.202) Micro-HTTP 1.0 80
Table 6.2: The host software configuration for a small, realistic network.
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From To Port Rule
all all all deny
outside internal network all deny
outside DMZ Web Server 80 allow
outside DMZ Mail Server 25 allow
outside DMZ DNS Server 53 allow
DMZ Mail Server apple 25 allow
DMZ DNS Server apple 53 allow
inside DMZ Web Server 80 allow
apple DMZ Mail Server 25 allow
apple DMZ DNS Server 53 allow
otter DMZ Mail Server 22 allow
otter DMZ DNS Server 22 allow
Table 6.3: A set of realistic firewall rules.
with only a single node, meaning that the outside attacker could not progress beyond the
start host. This is intuitively obvious, as the only possible points of access to the internal
network lie through the DMZ hosts, which are heavily patched and updated so that no
known security holes exist.
A novice attacker starting from within the network, however, is entirely different. The
internal network is often subject to numerous existing vulnerabilities due to relaxed security
rules and trust in the firewall. An internal attacker can often wreak havoc within a network.
In this case, the attacker begins from the inside attacker host. Because the theoretical
branching factor for internal nodes is so high, the test run is limited to only three levels
deep, corresponding to the attacker executing three actions. Even so, the resulting graph
is virtually incomprehensible, as is shown in Figure 6-8. With only attack paths of length
three, the attacker has obtained root-level access on eight of the ten internal hosts. In
addition, the attacker was able to crash or DOS six pieces of software on four internal
hosts. Finally, the inside attacker was able to obtain root access on both the mail and
DNS DMZ servers. To further analyze this DMZ breach, it is possible to prune the graph
to only those attacks that reach the mail server. There is a path that, within three actions,
achieves root access on the mail server. In addition, if NETSPA is run and pruned to each
of the other DMZ servers, the resulting graphs can be manually recombined into Figure 6-
9, which details the inside-to-DMZ attack paths. The attacker first breaks into "otter",
which is running a vulnerable version of rpc .statd. "Otter", as mentioned earlier, is the
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machine from which the administrator is allowed to remotely log into both the mail and
DNS server via SSH. The attacker then installs and runs a sniffer to obtain remote login
information, which includes the fact that an administrator on otter has administrator access
on "dnsserver" and "mailserver", servers in the DMZ. The attacker then logs into the remote
machines as an administrator using SSH.
This DMZ attack path quickly shows the most vulnerable routes to the DMZ. In this
case, there are only 2 paths and they both traverse the same starting nodes. A security
administrator can quickly improve the security of the DMZ against internal novice attackers
by disallowing the SSH connection between otter and the DMZ servers. This solution, how-
ever, might not be agreeable with the organization's requirements to be able to administer
the DMZ hosts from within the internal network. A security planner can then look further
up the attack graph and find that by improving the security of "otter" by upgrading or
turning off the rpc.statd service, the hosts in the DMZ are more protected from internal
attacks.
In this example, a "sniffing" action on "otter" represents either capturing network traffic
or monitoring key-strokes to determine that the administrator on "otter" can connect as
administrator via SSH to the mail and DNS servers in the DMZ. As previously stated,
NETSPA attempts to create worst-case attack graphs, which would allow this encrypted
information to be sniffed by a user who achieved root privileges.
6.3.2 Expert Computer Attacker
Whereas a novice computer user is limited to existing known vulnerabilities, an expert
attacker can often craft new exploits. In this case, assume that an advanced user can create
a new exploit for any of the hosts in the DMZ. Given past performance, both IIS and BIND
tend to be high-risk software packages.
If IIS contains a new remote root vulnerability that an expert attacker can exploit from
an outside attacker host that is not known to the general security community, NETSPA
generates a very small graph with only two actions: first exploit the web server using the
new exploit, then install a sniffer on the host. Since the attacker cannot then break into
other machines on the DMZ and the web server cannot connect into the private network,
the attacker can progress no further.
A new BIND vulnerability, on the other hand, provides more interesting results, as
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Figure 6-8: Three level attack graph 
of an
 insider 
attack.
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linux rpc.statd format string error(otter)
S:66
otter root
install and run sniffer(otter)
S: 131
otter root
remote login(mailserver) remote login(dnsserver)
S: 162S:7
mailserver root dnsserver root
Figure 6-9: Attack graph of the actions that reached the DMZ hosts starting from within
the internal network.
shown in Figure 6-10. In this case, the attacker leverages the new BIND exploit against
the DNS server. As the DNS server is allowed to connect into the internal network to
respond to DNS queries, the attacker is able to use another, existing BIND exploit against
host "apple," at which point the attacker is within the internal network and the graph
explodes, similar to that explored earlier with the novice internal attacker. This illustrates
the danger in relying on firewall rules alone as a security metric; if the essential machines
within the internal network are not secure, the entire network can be compromised. System
administrators on the real network that was used to create this model were not aware of
this problem until it was discovered by NETSPA.
6.3.3 Combining DMZ Server Hosts
A key feature of NETSPA is the ability to design a secure network before the hardware
actually exists. In this example, a NETSPA user is attempting to decide between two alter-
natives: creating a single DMZ server that performs the DNS, SMTP, and HTTP functions,
or creating separate servers for each service. This could allow a security administrator to
convincingly argue for the funding for more hardware if it can be shown that a multiple
source solution is more secure than a single point one.
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Figure 6-10: Attack graph of an expert outside attacker with a new BIND exploit.
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We have already examined the security of the separate hosts, now assume that we
combine all of the respective services into a single host.
Another interesting use of attack trees arises from the comparison between the graph
derived from original network of Figure 6-7 and that resulting from running NETSPA
against a similar network where all of the DMZ servers have been collapsed into a single
host. In the case of this "combined-server", a novice attacker can still not attack the DMZ
host nor the internal network from an outside starting position because all of the patches
are up to date.
A skilled attacker, on the other hand, has several additional means to attack the internal
network. Previously, each server resided on a separate, contained machine and we demon-
strated that a vulnerability in IIS only compromised the DMZ web server host. If all of the
services are running on a single machine, however, a compromise in any of the servers allows
the attacker access to the other services. Since the firewall rules must now be set up to allow
the single DMZ server to pass SMTP and DNS traffic to the internal network, the attacker
now has a path to the internal network after exploiting IIS via ports 53 and 25, which did
not exist when the services were hosted on different physical computers. The graphs for
a new IIS vulnerability, a new BIND vulnerability, and a new Sendmail vulnerability were
combined, as before, into a single graph to illustrate the fact that initial attacker now has
three initial points of entry into the internal network via the new IIS, BIND or Sendmail
vulnerabilities, where there was previously only one through the vulnerable BIND server.
6.3.4 IDS Placement To Detect External Attacks
An administrator would like to be able to defend the internal network against all attacks
from an outside host. Novel vulnerabilities and exploits against the servers in the DMZ,
coupled with the existence of valid SMTP and DNS connections between the DMZ and the
internal network, however, make this task quite difficult, as demonstrated in the previous
sections. Informed placement of IDSs might enable a system administrator to detect new
exploits.
In this example, a system administrator wishes to enhance the security of the realistic
network by placing either a host-based IDS on "apple" or a network-based IDS on the link
between the firewall and internal gateway to detect external attacks. As we have previously
shown, a novice external attacker using only existing vulnerabilities cannot even begin to
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Figure 6-11: Attack graph resulting from a new IIS, BIND and Sendmail vulnerability
against a combined server host.
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launch an attack against the recent and heavily patched servers in the DMZ. An expert
attacker with access to new vulnerabilities is an entirely different story. For this case,
we again assume, that the attacker has developed a novel BIND vulnerability. As most
network-based IDSs operate on a signature mechanism, this novel attack will be invisible
to a network IDS. A host-based system, on the other hand, is specification based and can
detect new attacks such as this one, as it causes the server process to operate outside of
specified software limits.
The attack graphs for each of the IDS placement possibilities are the same and are shown
in Figure 6-12. The attacker first exploits the new BIND vulnerability on the DMZ DNS
server and then exploits the internal server, "apple," with a known BIND vulnerability. At
this point, both the host- and network-based IDSs detect the second BIND exploit because
a signature has already been developed for the network-based IDS.
At first glance, a simple solution to protect the internal network is to upgrade the internal
server. The attack graph for an internal server running BIND of the same version as the
DMZ DNS server (the latest available, 9.2.1) and the host-based IDS is shown in Figure 6-
13. This figure is very similar to Figure 6-12, except that the second action executed by the
attacker is the new BIND attack. The host-based IDS can thus detect the new attack being
run against the internal server. The network-based IDS alternative, however, provides an
interesting result, shown in Figure 6-14. After the upgrade of the DNS server on "apple,"
the network-based IDS now fails to detect the incoming intruder, as the attacker is using a
new exploit without an existing IDS signature.
The results from this experiment provide several possible IDS placement and type alter-
natives. First of all, a host-based IDS on "apple" can detect both existing and novel attacks
entering the network, even if the software has been upgraded. The network-based IDS, how-
ever, can only detect the attacker entering the network using an existing vulnerability for
which a signature exists. The trade-off implicit in running the two different types of IDSs
is thus obvious: upgrade the software and run a host-based IDS, or do not upgrade the
internal DNS server, and run a network-based IDS. This result is non-intuitive, represents
an unusual instance of obtaining security by diversity.
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Figure 6-12: The attack graph resulting from an external attacker with a novel BIND
vulnerability, an older internal DNS server, and either a host- or network-based IDS.
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Figure 6-13: The attack graph resulting from an external attacker with a novel BIND
vulnerability, an upgraded internal DNS server, and a host-based IDS on "apple."7
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Figure 6-14: The attack graph resulting from an external attacker with a novel BIND
vulnerability, an upgraded internal DNS server, and a network-based IDS.
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6.3.5 Critical Internal Hosts
It has been estimated that insider attacks account for almost half of all the attacks directed
against organizations [23]. Therefore the trust placed in firewalls, IDSs, and other security
systems that focus on external hosts is partially misplaced. Determining critical internal
hosts is important in analyzing a network's vulnerability to an insider attacker. To do this,
we first logically divide the internal hosts into 3 groups: internal servers, administrator
machines, and user machines. There is only one internal server, "apple," which handles
all of the DNS and mail queries for the internal network. An administrator machine is
a host from which an administrator performs standard, root-level system administration
tasks, such as adding users or installing and upgrading software. To model this, we create
a set of trust relationship rules from the administrator's computer to each of the hosts
within an administration category: animal, color, or fruit. The administrator machines are
"otter," "blue," and "prune." Thus root on "otter" can administer "penguin." In addition,
we create another set of trust relationships that enable a global administrator on "otter"
who has root level access on all of the hosts in the network, including the internal and
DMZ servers. The allowable login rules are summarized in Table 6.4. In addition to the
host grouping, assume that all of the hosts on the internal network are invulnerable to any
existing actions. Finally, to simplify the discussion, we are assuming that all of the hosts
run some sort of remote login service.
Next, we enable single vulnerabilities against each type of host to determine the results
of an insider attack using only a single vulnerability on a single host. Enabling this single
vulnerability results in different attack graphs begin generated depending on the type of
host compromised. Each host type is discussed in the following sections.
User Host
Enabling a single vulnerability on a user host (i.e. "penguin," "green," "purple," or "plum)
results in an attack graph similar to the one shown in Figure 6-15. The attacker can only
issue the single attack against the only vulnerable host, in this case a remote root overflow
versus rpc .nf sd against host "penguin." Once on the host, the attacker can install a sniffer.
Since the user on this host is not an administrator, no allowable logins exist emanating from
this host and no additional vulnerabilities exist in the network, and thus the attacker can
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From User From Host To User To Host
root blue root green
root blue root purple
root prune root apple
root prune root plum
root otter root penguin
root otter root blue
root otter root green
root otter root purple
root otter root apple
root otter root prune
root otter root plum
root otter root bw-a
root otter root color-a
root otter root webserver
root otter root mailserver
root otter root dnsserver
Table 6.4: A set of administration login rules.
go no further.
Server Host
An insider that can exploit a vulnerability on a server host results in an attack graph that is
identical to that from when the insider exploited a simple user host. The practical difference,
however, is that the insider now has access to the services and data provided by the internal
server, as well as possible access to the DMZ. Since all vulnerabilities but one were assumed
to be fixed for this example, the attacker can not actually reach the DMZ servers, however
the ability to pass through the firewall through the SMTP and DNS ports from "apple" to
"mailserver" and "dnsserver," respectively could allow additional novel attacks.
Administrator Host
The final case, a new vulnerability on an administrator's machine, is the one that provides
the most interesting graph behavior. We have two different classes of administrator: local
admin, such as from hosts "blue" and "prune," and global admin, such as from "otter."
Figure 6-16 displays the graph for an insider exploiting a vulnerability in a local ad-
min host, more specifically host "blue." This results in the attacker being able to quickly
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Figure 6-15: Attack graph resulting from a single vulnerability on an internal user host.
achieve root level access on all of the hosts within blue's administration group: "purple"
and "green." This is accomplished by the attacker first exploiting the "new" SNMP vulner-
ability, sniffing the network or host to obtain necessary connection and trust relationship
information, and then simply logging into the other user hosts with administrator (root)
privileges.
A new vulnerability in a global administrator host is much more damaging to the entire
network. As the global administrator has access to all of the hosts on the network, the
attacker can exploit the vulnerability, and sniff, at which point the attacker then has root-
level access on all of the hosts in the network. This is further illustrated by the graph in
Figure 6-17. After only 3 actions, the attacker has access to all of the hosts except for the
webserver, which is only protected because of the blocking firewall rules.
6.4 Running Evaluation
NETSPA is practical to run in both space and time requirements, however there are some
feasibility constraints when fully computing large graphs. A complete graph of the simple
network can be generated in roughly 5 seconds on a Pentium III 500 running RedHat Linux
7.1 and using MySQL 4.0 alpha and the boost regular expression libraries. The entire
graph for the realistic network could not be feasibly computed once an attacker had access
to the internal network because it was too large to either compute or view. When within
the internal network, the branching factor of the graph was roughly equal to the number of
modeled exploit actions, or about 17. Reaching a recursive depth of 3 required only roughly
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Figure 6-16: Attack graph resulting from a single vulnerability on a host able to administer
two other machines in the internal network.
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Figure 6-17: Attack graph resulting from a single vulnerability on a host able to administer
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1.5 minutes, and the complete generated graph could not be visualized. Statistics generated
on the graph, however, demonstrated that every internal host but one was compromised.
NETSPA was profiled using gprof, and it was found that the regular expression libraries
and associated string operations accounted for more than 70% of the entire running time.
This is intuitively obvious, as NETSPA relies heavily on the regular expression libraries and
attempts to match at least one REM clause of every action against every host at each level
in the recursion. In addition, NETSPAmakes extensive use of the standard C++ container
classes to simplify program design and readability, which also appeared high on the list of
most-time required functions in the profiler. We are looking into alternative ways to speed
up the matching and determine whether the C++ containers are essential to the design of
the system.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
NETSPA provides a basic architecture upon which many other modules and functions can
be built. NETSPA has been shown to work on relatively large, realistic networks with a
substantial number of vulnerabilities. NETSPA would derive the most benefit from a larger
database of REM defined actions and more test networks to further exercise the system.
In addition, a slightly more extensive REM syntax and speed enhancements would provide
NETSPA with additional functionality and useability.
The biggest factor contributing to the useability of NETSPA is the action database. Our
current database was constructed to illustrate certain concepts on our sample networks, and,
as such, only contains 18 specific exploit vulnerabilities and 3 general ones, such as a brute
force password crack and sniffer installation. Extending this database would allow for more
networks to be modeled and correctly analyzed. The database should be extended by finding
vulnerabilities on new modeled networks and adding exploits only for these vulnerabilities.
A larger set of out-of-date actions is not necessary.
NETSPA could benefit from additional realistic network testing to exercise the system
and discover any additional limitations. One such known limitation is the inability to
correctly handle multi-homed hosts, as only a single path is constructed between any two
hosts before NETSPA tries to match any actions. Similarly, NETSPA does not currently
have the functionality to modify firewall rulesets or routing tables through the course of
an attack. Modeling large, realistic networks would discover these limitations and allow for
them to be fixed.
The REM language for NETSPA could be enhanced to include slightly more specific
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syntax, such as additional privilege levels, to enable an action to be more exactly specified.
As it stands, several types of actions need to be relaxed in order for them to be defined in
REM, such as the ability to read a file from a remote host or log in as a limited privilege user.
An attack graph generated with a richer REM specification will have fewer unnecessary path
components.
Graph generation speed also contributes to the useability of NETSPA, however the
current implementation is quite efficient. As every action in the database must be attempted
against every host in the network at each level in the recursion, limiting the number of
actions used by the computation engine would result in a significant speed increase. Several
techniques could be implemented within NETSPA to prune the network models and action
database.
Hosts within a network running the same basic operating system and software can be
realistically combined into a single representative host. This technique limits the number of
hosts within a network to the number of distinctly different hosts. At the moment, this must
be done manually by the NETSPA user who creates the network, however an automatic
procedure would be a useful enhancement. The action database can be pruned before the
matching loop to contain only those actions that are possible to execute against the hosts in
the specific network. For example, if all of the hosts on a network run a Microsoft Windows
operating system, all actions that require other operating systems could be removed from
the list, resulting in decreased running times. Once this action pruning is done, we estimate
that the number of actions that can possibly be executed against a network is on the
order of tens, and not hundreds. This reinforces our position that the "realistic" network
accurately models an actual network and that NETSPA provides a scalable graph generation
mechanism.
Finally, NETSPA would benefit greatly from additional input and output modules. Cur-
rently, only NetViz exists to import information into a network model, and the GraphVizGrapher
is the only output graphing mechanism. Creating additional ways to lessen time spent by
a user modeling a network and increasing the utility of the output graphs would benefit
NETSPA and its users. Because of the database nature of the network model, and the
standard interface for the Grapher, these additional modules should not be difficult to
implement.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
Existing security software and security information resources are necessary to analyze the
security of a network. They all, however, fail to take into account several networking
fundamentals, such as the structure of a network and the existing security policy. Cur-
rent software is thus limited to single-point vulnerabilities, and overlooks an entire class of
system security that involves the interplay between several different single-point vulnera-
bilities, network topology, intrusion detection systems, and other vulnerability protection
mechanisms.
NETSPA augments existing security resources with the ability to generate attack graphs
and assist a network administrator in creating secure networks. The resulting attack graphs
take into account network and host configurations and individual vulnerabilities, placement
of intrusion detection systems, firewalls and associated rulesets, and critical network re-
sources. This allows the security administrator to modify a simulated network and deter-
mine the network configurations that minimize attack scenarios and protect critical network
elements.
NETSPA is easier to use and faster than other attack graph generation systems. The
ease of network configuration entry and the simplicity of the attack language allow a user
to quickly and easily define a network and model new exploits and actions. The use of
NetViz also provides intuitive user access directly to the network model. Aside from ease
of use, NETSPA has proven to be comparable in running times to arguably more efficient
model-checking solutions [33], and provides additional information evident in the entire
attack graph, as opposed to just a graph where all nodes end in a certain goal state.
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Skill Location Actions Internal Hosts DMZ Hosts
Compromised Compromised
Novice Outside all known 0/10 0/3
Novice Inside all known 8/10 2/3
Novice Inside all known 8/10 1/1
Expert Outside all known + new IIS exploit 0/10 1/3
Expert Outside all known + new BIND exploit 8/10 1/3
Expert Outside all known + new Sendmail exploit 0/10 1/3
Table 8.1: A summary of experimental results for a realistic network with multiple DMZ
servers.
Skill Location Actions Internal Hosts DMZ Hosts
Compromised Compromised
Expert Outside all known + new IIS exploit 8/10 1/1
Expert Outside all known + new BIND exploit 8/10 1/1
Expert Outside all known + new Sendmail exploit 8/10 1/1
Table 8.2: A summary of experimental results for a realistic network with a single "com-
bined" DMZ server.
A summary of the experiments discussed in Chapter 6 and corresponding results is shown
in the tables presented in this chapter. Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 describe the success of novice
and expert attackers against the internal and DMZ hosts, both with separate servers and a
single combined server. The worst-case scenarios arose when either the attacker was inside
the network, or the attacker was able to exploit a new vulnerability against the combined
server in the DMZ. Both of these situations allowed the attacker root access on 8 out of
the 10 inside machines and either 2 out of the 3 DMZ servers, or the single DMZ server.
When the DMZ services were split amongst different physical machines, an expert attacker
was only able to penetrate the internal network in one of the three cases, exploiting the
DNS server, whereas when they were collocated on a single machine, any vulnerability
against any of the services resulted in internal network compromises. NETSPA thus clearly
demonstrates the relative security of various networks against several different types of
attackers, and allows a system administrator to effectively weigh security factors against
other considerations, such as useability and cost.
Table 8.3 summarizes the results obtained from running NETSPA with different IDS
types and DMZ and internal server versions. An interesting and non-obvious consequence of
upgrading internal servers is that a network IDS monitoring traffic flowing into the internal
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Internal External
Actions IDS Type Server Server Visibility
Version Version
all known + new BIND 9.2.1 exploit host-based 8.10.2 9.2.1 visible
all known + new BIND 9.2.1 exploit network-based 8.10.2 9.2.1 visible
all known + new BIND 9.2.1 exploit host-based 9.2.1 9.2.1 visible
all known + new BIND 9.2.1 exploit network-based 9.2.1 9.2.1 invisible
Table 8.3: A summary of experimental results with differing IDS types and vulnerable server
versions.
Type of Machine Internal Hosts DMZ Hosts
With Vulnerability Compromised Compromised
user host 1/10 0/3
server host 1/10 0/3
local admin host 3/10 0/3
global admin host 10/10 3/3
Table 8.4: A summary of experimental results enabling one vulnerability at a time.
network will not be able to detect attacks against the internal server as no signatures exist.
NETSPA has thus shown that diversity among separate services and components increases
a network's security by forcing an attacker to create several new exploits to obtain internal
network access.
Finally, Table 8.4 provides a summary of critical internal hosts to be protected in the
case of insider attacks. In our cases, a user could exploit a single type of host, be it simple
a user's personal host, an internal server machine, the machine of an administrator of a
few computers, and the machine of a site-wide administrator. This clearly presents the
hosts which, when compromised, impact internal network security more than others. A
new vulnerability in any administrator's computer allows instant access to those computers
which are under the administrator's jurisdiction. In the case of a site-wide administrator,
this effect is instant and devastating, as the attacker has complete administrator access to
the entire network, including internal and DMZ servers. These results present a strong case
for several separate administrators with non-overlapping administration privileges.
NETSPA has several weaknesses, the largest of which is a limited database of modeled
actions, however it has proven its ability to provide useful information in a realistic network
setting. Continued use and support of NETSPA will solve most of the current limitations,
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and allow NETSPA to become a viable security solution.
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Appendix A
REM Description
A complete REM action definition is a set of statements divided into three sections: re-
quirements, effects, and modifies. The capital words are the keywords of REM that define
the information contained within the statement. In addition, any words within <> are
variables that are bound at the time of action execution and include <currentlhost>,
<current-user>, <target host>, <target-user>, <exposed-sof tware>, and <port>.
Quotation marks are required for all string literals within a statement. The proceeding
statement descriptions make use of the following "variable : := literal" bindings:
hosti ::= <current-lost>
or <target-host>
software4 ::= "vendor:product name:common version:exact version"
or TYPE 'software type''
user ::= none
or nologin
or user
or root
or <current-user>
X ::= integer
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A. 1 Requirements
host4 RUNS softwarei [DOS] [TROJAN]
requires that hostj must run the specified piece of software. The optional DOS and
TROJAN flags are used to determine the required state of the software: DOS means that
the software is not working properly, whether due to a crash or a denial-of-service
attack, and the TROJAN flag denotes that the existing software has been replaced by
a trojan piece of software. This statement defines the <exposed-software> and
associated <port> variables that can be used in other statements. There can be
multiple RUNS statement per requires section, however only one will match and define
the <exposed.software> and corresponding <port>.
hosti ALSORUNS software [DOS] [TROJAN]
defines additional software pieces that must be running in order for action to work.
This could include a specific operating system or system tool. The syntax is exactly
the same as that of the RUNS statement. Multiple ALSORUNS statements are allowed.
[useri ON host2 ] HASACCESS user ON hostj
requires that user on hostj can login (via authentication or existing trust relation-
ship) to hostj as userj. If the first user/host pair is left out, <currentliost> and
<current user> are assumed. This statement also sets the <target_user> variable,
for use in later sections.
hostj CANCONNECT host [PORT X]
requires that hostk be able to connect through the network to hostj on port X, given
all of the firewall rules and possible paths. If the port is omitted, it is assumed to be
the port of the exposed software.
A.2 Effects
[user ON hosti] HASACCESS user ON host
provides a trust relationship between user on host, and user on hostj. If the from
user/host pair is not provided, this establishes a blanket trust relation from any
user/host combination to the target host.
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hosti RUNS {softwarei or <exposed-software>} [PORT X] [DOS] [TROJAN]
changes the state of the system by starting up the softwarej on port X. If
<exposed-sof tware> is used instead, this changes the state of the exposed software.
TRUST-RELATIONSHIPS
provides the current user with all of the network trust relationships that pertain to
any host on the same subnet as <target-host>. This is used to model a sniffer.
A.3 Modifies
<current-host> = <target-host>
transitions the attacker from location <currentlhost> to <target-host>.
<current-user> = {useri or <target-user>}
transitions the current user from <current-user> to useri or <target-user>.
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Appendix B
Realistic Actions
The following list defines the base set of actions used to create attack graphs against the
realistic network. Each action and its coresponding description, CVE number (if one exists),
locality, visibility to an IDS, and partial REM specification is included.
Remote Login : authorized login from one host to another. Remote. Visible
Requires: <target-host> RUNS TYPE "Remote Login Server"
<current-host> CAN.CONNECT <target..host> PORT <port>
HAS..ACCESS <target-user> ON <target-host>
Modifies: <current..host> = <target-host>
Kcurrent-user> = <target-user>
Brute Force Password Crack : crack a user password after obtaining some prior knowledge of the system. Remote. Invisible.
Requires: HAS-ACCESS nologin ON <target-host>
Effects: HAS.ACCESS user ON <target..host>
SNMP Information Leak : NETBIOS share information may be published through SNMP registry keys in NT. CAN-1999-0499.
Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "-:enmp:-:-"
<target-host> ALSO-RUNS "Microsoft:Windows 2000:Advance Server:Advance Server beta 3"
<current-host> CAN.CONNECT <target-host>
Effects: HAS-ACCESS nologin ON <target..host>
Install and Run Sniffer : install a sniffer to operate the target machine in promiscuous mode or locally obtain keystrokes. CAN-
1999-0530. Local. Visible.
Requires: HAS-ACCESS root ON <target.host>
Effects: <target-host> RUNS "-:sniffer:-:-"
TRUST-RELATIONSHIPS
Linux nfsd Buffer Overflow : buffer overflow in NFS server on Linux allows attackers to execute commands via a long pathname.
CAN-1999-0832. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "-:rpc.nfsd:-:-"
<target-host> ALSO-RUNS "RedHat:Linux:5.2:-"
<current-host> CAN-CONNECT <target.host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> - root
Tektronix 840 Web Server Vulnerability : web server in Tektronix PhaserLink Printer 840.0 and earlier allows a remote attacker
to gain administrator access by directly calling undocumented URLs such as ncl-items.html and ncl.subjects.html. CAN-1999-
1508. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "-:Micro-HTTP:1.O:-"
<target-host> ALSO-RUNS "Tektroniz:Phaser Network Printer:840:-"
<current-host> CAN.CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-iost> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
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Linux rpc.statd. Format String Error : rpc.statd in the nfs-utils package in various Linux distributions does not properly cleanse
untrusted format strings, which allows remote attackers to gain root privileges. CVE-2000-0666. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "-:rpc.statd:-:-"
<target-host> ALSO-RUNS "RedHat:Linux:7.2:-"
Kcurrent-host> CAN-CONNECT <target..host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
List NT Domain Users via Null Session : Windows NT allows remote attackers to list all users in a domain by obtaining the
domain SID with the LsaQueryInformationPolicy policy function via a null session and using the SID to list the users. CVE-
2000-1200. Remote. Invisible.
Requires: <target..host> RUNS "-:smb:-:-"
<target..host> ALSO..RUNS "Microsoft:Windows NT:4.0:-"
<current-host> CAN..CONNECT <target.host>
Effects: HAS-ACCESS nologin ON <target-host>
BIND 8 Buffer Overflow in TSIG : buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code in BIND 8 allows remote at-
tackers to gain root privileges. CVE-2001-0010. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "ISC:BIND:8.2.2 p3:-"
<target-host> RUNS "ISC:BIND:8.1.2:-"
<current-host> CAONCONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
SSH Integer Overflow : CORE SDI SSH1 CRC-32 compensation attack detector allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary com-
mands on an SSH server or client via an integer overflow. CVE-2001-0144. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target..host> RUNS "SSH Communications Security:SSH:1.2.27:-"
<current-host> CAN-CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
IIS ISAPI Print Request Overflow : buffer overflow in Internet Printing ISAPI extension in Windows 2000 allows remote attackers
to gain root privileges via a long print request that is passed to the extension through IIS 5.0. CVE-2001-0241. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "Microsoft:IIS HTTP:5:-"
<current-host> CAN.CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
IIS .. \ Directory Traversal : directory traversal vulnerability in IIS 5.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary
commands by encoding .. (dot dot) and "iharacters twice. CAN-2001-0333. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "Microsoft:IIS HTTP:5:-"
<current-host> CAN-CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current..host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
MySQL .. Directory Traversal : directory traversal vulnerability in MySQL before 3.23.36 allows local users to modify arbitrary
files and gain privileges by creating a database whose name starts with .. (dot dot). CVE-2001-0407. Local. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "T.C.I DataKonsult:MySQL:3.20:-"
<target-host> RUNS "T.C.X DataKonsult:MySQL:3.22:-"
Modifies: <current-user> = root
NTP Buffer Overflow : buffer overflow in ntpd ntp daemon 4.0.99k and earlier (aka xntpd and xntp3) allows remote attackers to
cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary commands via a long readvar argument. CVE-2001-0414. Remote.
Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "Dave Mills:ntpd:4.0.99k:-"
<current-host> CAN-CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Effects: <target-host> RUNS <exposed-software> DOS
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
IIS DOS via WebDAV Request : Vulnerability in IIS 5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (restart) via a long,
invalid WebDAV request. CAN-2001-0508. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "Microsoft:IIS HTTP:5:-"
<current-host> CAN.CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Effects: <target-host> RUNS <exposed-software> DOS
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Wu-ftpd Glob Handling Error : wu-ftpd 2.6.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a "{" argument to
commands such as CWD, which is not properly handled by the glob function. CAN-2001-0550. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target..host> RUNS "University of Washington:Wu-ftpd:2.6.0:-"
<current-host> CAN.CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Effects: <target-host> RUNS <exposed-software> DOS
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
CDE dtspcd Overflow : buffer overflow in the client connection routine of libDtSvc.so.1 in CDE Subprocess Control Service (dtspcd)
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands. CVE-2001-0803. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target..host> RUNS "-:dtspcd:-:-"
<target..host> ALSO-RUNS "Open Group:Common Desktop Environment:1.2:-"
<current-host> CAN.CONNECT <target..host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = root
Windows SNMP Malformed Management Request : buffer overflow in SNMP agent service in Windows 95/98/98SE, Windows
NT 4.0, Windows 2000, and Windows XP allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or execute arbitrary code via a
malformed management request. CAN-2002-0053. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "-:snmp:-:-"
<target-host> ALSO-RUNS "Microsoft:Windows 2000:Advance Server:Advance Server beta 3"
<current-host> CAN-CONNECT <target-host>
Effects: <target-host> RUNS <exposed-software> DOS
Modifies: <current..host> = <target-host>
<current.user> = root
IIS FTP DOS : the FTP service in Internet Information Server (IIS) 4.0, 5.0 and 5.1 allows attackers who have established an FTP
session to cause a denial of service via a specially crafted status request. CAN-2002-0073. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target..host> RUNS "Microsoft:IIS FTP:5:-"
HAS-ACCESS user ON <target..host>
<current-host> CAN-CONNECT <target..host> PORT <port>
Effects: <target-host> RUNS <exposed-software> DOS
PHP Upload Buffer Overflow : buffer overflows in (1) php..mime-split in PHP 4.1.0, 4.1.1, and 4.0.6 and earlier, and (2) php3..mime-split
in PHP 3.0.x allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a multipart/form-data HTTP POST request when f ile-uploads
is enabled. CAN-2002-0081. Remote. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "PHP:PHP:3.O.18:-"
<target-host> ALSO-RUNS "Apache Group:Apache:1.3.9:-"
<current-host> CAN-CONNECT <target-host> PORT <port>
Modifies: <current-host> = <target-host>
<current-user> = user
OpenSSH Off-By-One Error : off-by-one error in the channel code of OpenSSH 2.0 through 3.0.2 allows local users or remote
malicious servers to gain privileges. CAN-2002-0083. Local. Visible.
Requires: <target-host> RUNS "OpenBSD:OpenSSH:2.9:-"
Modifies: <current-user> = root
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